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ABSTRACT
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court and Congress have
made the federal writ of habeas corpus increasingly less available to
state prisoners. By and large, they have restricted the writ through the
creation and expansion of procedural barriers to federal habeas review. Recently, however, the policy debate over how to handle the
deluge of federal habeas petitions has begun to shift away from creating procedural hurdles and toward a more straightforward narrowing of the substantive scope of the writ, as Congress has started to
consider bills that would preclude state prisoners from raising certain
federal constitutional claims in their habeas petitions.
This Article examines how Congress might narrow the substantive scope of the writ of habeas corpus, should it ultimately decide to
do so. The Article first considers the various criteria and the underlying theories of habeas that Congress might use to select the federal
constitutional claims that would remain cognizable on habeas. The
Article concludes that the best guide is a theory that accommodates
both the historical role of habeas as a bulwark against fundamentally
unfair incarceration and the current function of habeas as an additional “appeal” from state court. The Article then delineates which
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constitutional claims should remain available on habeas, and revisits
the current procedural hurdles to see which may be eliminated or
loosened. Finally, the Article briefly assesses the constitutionality of
this new, narrower statutory writ.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court and Congress have
made the federal writ of habeas corpus increasingly less available to
state prisoners.1 By and large, they have restricted the writ by making
it less available as a practical matter through the creation and expansion of procedural barriers to federal habeas review. They have rarely
chosen to narrow the writ directly by limiting the types of federal constitutional claims that state prisoners can bring.2 Indeed, the only two
changes to the substantive scope of the writ have come from the Supreme Court, which in the last three decades eliminated habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims and claims premised on developments in the law arising after a prisoner’s direct appeal is over.3
Congress, by contrast, has not amended the language of the 1867

1. This Article concerns the statutory writ granting habeas jurisdiction over petitions by
persons in state custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. III
1997). This is not the only writ commonly referred to as the “writ of habeas corpus,” however.
There are two other statutory habeas writs: (i) one available to persons held in federal custody
pursuant to a conviction, see id. § 2255 (1994), and (ii) one available to any persons held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” whether before or
after trial, id. § 2241(c)(3) (1994). There may also be a common law writ of habeas corpus,
which is much narrower than the current statutory writs and which exists solely to guard against
complete deprivation of the writ. See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV.
247, 254 (1989) [hereinafter Friedman, Two Habeas] (positing the existence of a common law
writ that is independent of the statutory writ and is “narrow in scope and historically used to
free prisoners subject to fundamentally unlawful incarceration”); see also infra Part V (discussing constitutional concerns affecting habeas). For state prisoners challenging their convictions,
however, the Supreme Court has held that § 2254 is the sole remedy. See Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 486 (1953) (“[F]ederal courts may not grant habeas corpus for those convicted by the
state except pursuant to § 2254 . . . .”).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (authorizing habeas petitions for any violation of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). Although the plain language of § 2254 arguably
reaches all violations of federal statutory and treaty law, this Article concentrates solely on the
substantive reach of the writ with regard to constitutional claims. It should be noted, however,
that the Court has limited the reach of habeas to only those federal statutory violations that
qualify as “‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice
[or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.’” Reed v. Farley,
512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994) (plurality) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see
also id. at 356 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (adopting the narrower view that “[m]ost statutory violations . . . are simply not important enough to invoke the
extraordinary habeas jurisdiction”).
3. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 294-96 (1989) (barring habeas petitioners from raising any constitutional claims based on legal developments taking place after their convictions
had become final on direct appeal); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (removing from
the scope of habeas review claims based on violations of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule). A fuller discussion of Stone and its progeny is included infra at Part II.B.3. Teague is discussed in more detail infra at Part II.A.3.
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statute defining the writ for state prisoners. That statute continues to
reach all cases where any person may be restrained of her liberty in
violation of the Constitution, or in violation of any treaty or law of
the United States.4
Recently, however, Congress has started to consider amending
the statutory writ in ways that would explicitly narrow its substantive
scope.5 In the 106th Congress, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a bill that, among other things, would remove from the
scope of habeas those claims based on the admission of confessions
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona6 where the underlying
confession was otherwise voluntary.7 Given the revived congressional
interest in the federal writ’s substantive scope that is reflected by this
bill, the time is ripe to examine how Congress, if it ultimately decides
to narrow the substantive scope of the writ, might constitutionally do
so.8 In fashioning any such leaner, cleaner writ of habeas corpus,

4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (allowing habeas petitions for any violation of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). The first federal statutory writ of habeas corpus
was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and was available solely to federal prisoners.
See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. The writ was extended in 1833 to state
prisoners who were arrested for committing acts authorized by federal law. See Act of Mar. 2,
1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634, 634-35. The writ was extended again in 1842 to reach state prisoners
who were “subjects or citizens of foreign states, and domiciled therein.” Act of Aug. 29, 1842,
ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539-40. The writ was not extended generally to all state prisoners until 1867.
See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 384, 384-85.
5. No one disputes Congress’s power to delineate the substantive scope of the writ. See
Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role for State Courts?, 27 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 297, 311 (1996) (“Congress, too, certainly has the ability to amend the habeas statutes to
broaden the scope of federal review.”); David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV.
735, 739 (“A point of agreement among all visions is that federal habeas for state prisoners is a
creature of federal statute and that primary lawmaking authority belongs to Congress.”); Gary
Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 669
(1982) (“Congress, however, not the Court, has the constitutional power to determine which
tribunal will vindicate federal rights.”). Indeed, many argue that it should be Congress—and not
the courts—that does so. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 765 (1987) (discussing the reasons that Congress has the power to
decide the scope of habeas review).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the police must advise suspects of their rights before
questioning them).
7. See Judicial Improvement Act of 1999, S. 248, 106th Cong., § 12. The constitutional underpinnings of Miranda are already under attack. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667,
690 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Miranda is not constitutionally required), cert. granted 120 S.
Ct. 578 (1999).
8. This Article takes no position on the wisdom of curtailing the writ. There are valid reasons for leaving the substantive contours of the writ untouched, some of which are discussed in
greater detail infra at Part II.A. A fuller analysis of the reasons favoring and disfavoring a narrower writ is beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, this Article assumes for the sake of
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Congress will be called upon to balance the important role of federal
habeas as a matter of criminal justice policy, its constitutionally mandated underpinnings, and the costs it imposes upon state sovereignty
and upon the federal courts.
Part I of this Article provides a necessary backdrop by sketching
out the current contours of the writ, as they exist in practice. To do
so, this part begins by describing the patchwork of procedural and
quasi-procedural doctrines that the Supreme Court and Congress
have developed in the past thirty years and turns to an examination of
how those doctrines work together to make it more difficult for state
prisoners to present and prevail upon their federal constitutional
claims on federal habeas. Finally, this part examines whether this indirect approach to limiting habeas leads to rational and desirable outcomes as a matter of public policy.
Part II then turns to the primary question presented in this Article: how a Congress intent upon directly curtailing habeas by narrowing the substantive scope of the writ might proceed. Toward that
end, Part II examines the possible approaches Congress might take in
curtailing the scope of the writ and concludes that Congress would
best be served by declaring certain federal constitutional claims to be
outside of habeas review.
In deciding which claims to exclude from habeas, Congress
should proceed with a clear vision of the purpose and role of the federal writ of habeas corpus in modern postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, Part II canvasses the five theories of habeas most often advanced in the academic literature and in Supreme Court opinions.
This survey finds that the purpose of the writ is to guard against fundamental unfairness9 and that the writ largely functions as an extension of the state appellate review process.10 Part II thus recommends
that Congress decide which claims to include in federal habeas review
by asking which claims are so vital to assuring fundamentally fair
its analysis that policymakers have concluded that a narrower substantive writ is in the public
interest.
9. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989) (plurality) (holding that the requirement that a petit jury consist of a fair cross-section of the community was not the sort of “absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness” that can be applied retroactively on habeas); see also
infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the “fundamental fairness” rationale). Academics agree. See, e.g.,
Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485,
488 (1995) [hereinafter Friedman, Failed Enterprise] (“[H]abeas clearly has something to do
with [fairness] matters such as vindicating constitutional rights . . . .”).
10. See McCord, supra note 5, at 838 (“There were then, and still are, many significant areas of habeas jurisprudence that can be explained by the appellate review vision . . . .”).
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criminal proceedings that they must be reheard on federal habeas
notwithstanding the prior opportunity to litigate them in the state
courts. This model highlights the salient fact that Congress, when reshaping the writ of habeas, is only deciding which federal constitutional claims may be relitigated on habeas. That is because the state
courts reviewing a conviction on direct appeal or in state collateral
proceedings will continue to have jurisdiction over all federal constitutional claims, regardless of their cognizability on habeas, and because federal habeas courts will continue to have “backstop” jurisdiction over any federal constitutional claims that a prisoner did not
have an adequate opportunity to litigate in the state courts.
Part III explores what a writ based on this combined model—
which in essence gives content to the concept of fundamental fairness
by reference to the appellate function of habeas—would look like.
The part starts by articulating the standard that could guide
legislators in selecting the federal constitutional claims that prisoners
would be able to relitigate on habeas. Part III then briefly surveys the
federal constitutional rights that would likely be essential to secure
“fundamental fairness,” as that term is newly defined, thereby
providing a brief catalogue of the constitutional claims that would fall
within the scope of this new statutory writ.
With the task of redefining the substantive scope completed, Part
IV revisits the procedural and quasi-procedural doctrines that currently limit the availability of the writ. Because these doctrines were
created in large part to screen out claims, there is less need for them
once the substantive scope of the habeas is narrowed to the subset of
constitutional claims deemed sufficiently important and fundamental
to warrant relitigation in the federal courts. Consequently, this part
examines these procedural and quasi-procedural doctrines to see how
they could be modified or eliminated to accommodate a narrower
substantive writ.
Part V briefly recounts the key points to be considered in assessing whether this newly constituted writ would accord with the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”11 Although Congress, in amending the substantive scope of the
writ, is not (as the courts are) bound by the current statutory lan-

11.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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guage of the writ, Congress’s discretion to fashion its normative vision
of the statutory writ is still bounded by the Constitution. This final
part therefore evaluates the constitutionality of the substantively narrower writ developed in this Article.
I.

THE PROCEDURAL THICKET

Although section 2254(a) explicitly states that the federal writ of
habeas corpus is available to state prisoners held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,”12
that provision may give an inaccurate picture of the practical availability of the writ today. That is because the Supreme Court has established several doctrines that regulate habeas procedure or otherwise affect the legal or practical availability of the writ.13 It is only by
understanding these doctrines and how they interrelate that one can
accurately assess the actual scope of the writ today or understand why
some policymakers would support a more explicit and direct curtailment of the scope of habeas. Familiarity with these doctrines as currently constituted also provides a helpful backdrop for evaluating
how they should be modified if Congress expressly narrows the substantive scope of the writ.14
The exhaustion doctrine, the oldest of the procedural barriers,15
requires a state prisoner in most cases to present the substance of any
federal constitutional claim to the state courts before it may be raised
in a federal habeas petition.16 This doctrine seeks “to minimize fric12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Supp. III 1997).
13. See supra text accompanying note 3.
14. A fuller discussion of how these procedural doctrines should be modified in light of the
proposals in this Article is contained infra at Part IV.
15. The Court first established a discretionary exhaustion doctrine in 1886. See Royall, 117
U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (holding that the statute directing federal courts to hear habeas cases “does
not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert to powers conferred upon it”). Congress codified a mandatory exhaustion requirement when it amended §
2254 in 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, ch. 153, 62 Stat. 869, 967.
16. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (holding that habeas petitioners must present their claims to a state court before requesting federal habeas review); Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It is has been settled since Ex parte Royall that a state prisoner must
normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)). Although exhaustion is technically an equitable
doctrine (that is, a prisoner’s failure to exhaust state remedies does not rob the federal courts of
jurisdiction), “there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue his
available state remedies.” Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987); accord Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (“[S]tate remedies must be exhausted except in unusual circumstances.”).
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tion between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the
State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.”17 Given this purpose, a prisoner
need not “exhaust his state remedies” if “there is an absence of available State corrective process” or if “circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the [habeas] applicant.”18
At first blush, a failure to exhaust state remedies would appear
easy to fix: return to state court, present the unexhausted federal
claims to the state tribunal, and raise the now-exhausted claims in a
second federal habeas petition. The federal exhaustion doctrine
would not stand in the way. However, another doctrine—the procedural default doctrine19—would, because a prisoner returning to state
court to raise a new claim would probably be denied a ruling on the
merits of his claim by the state’s procedural rules, which usually require criminal defendants to raise all of their claims at once at the
earliest possible time and which allow proceedings to be reopened
only for a short time after the state courts issue their rulings.20 A prisoner returning to state court years after he is convicted in order to
exhaust a federal claim is unlikely to be able to satisfy these state procedural rules.21 The penalty for failing to adhere to those rules is the
A state prisoner does not have to present his claims to state courts more than once, however, even if there exist further avenues of state court review. As the Court stated, “once the
state courts have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for a petitioner ‘to ask the state for collateral review, based upon the same evidence and issues already decided by direct review.’” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953)).
17. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1997); see also Duckworth, 454 U.S. at 3 (explaining that a prisoner need not exhaust his state remedies if “there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort
to obtain relief”). A federal court may also waive the exhaustion requirement if there are
grounds to deny the habeas petition on its merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application
for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).
19. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), established the modern procedural default
doctrine. See id. at 87-91 (holding that federal habeas review is unavailable for issues that were
barred from consideration in state court because of state procedural rules); see also infra note 23
and accompanying text.
20. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 & nn.8-11 (1993) (listing time limits that
apply in various states).
21. A 1995 study by the Department of Justice found that the average time between a defendant’s conviction in state court and the filing of his federal habeas petition was 1802 days—or
nearly five years. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS 12 (1995).
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state court’s refusal to hear the merits of the prisoner’s claim. Of
course, the petitioner in this situation has technically exhausted his
state remedies because there are no further state remedies to exhaust—they are all foreclosed to him.22
But federal courts entertaining habeas petitions are required by
the procedural default doctrine to honor state procedural rules. Consequently, if a state court finds that the prisoner did not comply with a
state procedural rule and accordingly refuses to reach the merits of
her federal constitutional claim, that claim is considered “procedurally defaulted” and may be reexamined by a federal habeas court
only under certain circumstances.23
In the 1960s, those circumstances were numerous. In fact, under
the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Fay v. Noia,24 federal courts
were all but obligated to reach the merits of federal constitutional
claims notwithstanding violation of state procedural rules, except
when the habeas petitioner had “deliberately sought to subvert or
evade the orderly adjudication of his federal defenses in the state
courts.”25 The Court has subsequently narrowed the conditions under
which a federal court may disregard a state’s finding that a prisoner
failed to comply with state procedural rules. Fay has been overruled,26
22. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there
are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 12526 n.28 (1982) (noting that a petitioner’s claims can be exhausted when state procedural bars
prevent consideration of some claims that could have been raised).
23. On direct review of a state conviction, the Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear a federal constitutional claim if the state court determines that the prisoner failed to
meet state procedural rules and refuses to reach the merits of her claim. That is because the
state procedural bar constitutes an “adequate” and “independent” state ground for the judgment, such that any holding of the Supreme Court on the merits of the constitutional claim
would be “advisory” (and hence beyond the Court’s power under Article III), because it would
not affect the judgment of conviction. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81 (observing that “it is a
well-established principle of federalism that a state decision resting on an adequate foundation
of state substantive law is immune from review in the federal courts” and holding the same for
state procedural law); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1989) (discussing the doctrine by which the Court disclaims authority to review state court judgments that rest on an independent and adequate nonfederal ground); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)
(noting that federal courts have no jurisdiction to review state court judgments supportable on
an independent, nonfederal ground); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 63436 (1874) (holding that habeas review is only appropriate where there is a federal question the
answer to which would have an impact on the final judgment in the case).
24. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
25. Id. at 433.
26. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51 (overruling Fay’s holding that federal courts can hear
issues that were excluded from state court proceedings based on independent and adequate
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and a federal court hearing a habeas petition today may not reach the
merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner can either show “cause for the noncompliance [with the state procedural
rule] and some showing of actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation”27 or can demonstrate “‘that failure to consider [his federal] claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.’”28
These exceptions have been defined very narrowly. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has been held to exist only “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”29 The Court
has frankly acknowledged that this “more like than not”30 standard
for innocence “is a very narrow exception”31 and that “habeas corpus
petitions that advance a substantial claim of actual innocence are extremely rare.”32
The “cause” and “prejudice” standard is similarly narrow. Thus
far, the Court has not yet defined precisely how a habeas petitioner
establishes “prejudice.”33 The Court has, however, found that a petitioner may establish “cause” for noncompliance with state procedural
rules by showing either that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment,34 that “the factual or legal basis for
a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,”35 or that state offistate procedural grounds).
27. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84.
28. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)).
29. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
30. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
31. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992). In the context of a capital sentencing, the
Court held that a defendant seeking habeas review of aggravating circumstances allowing imposition of the death penalty must establish that “no reasonable juror would find him eligible for
the death penalty.” Id. at 348 (emphasis added). It is not enough to prove that no jury would
have imposed the death penalty after weighing the factors making the defendant eligible for the
death penalty against those mitigating against it. See id. at 345-46.
32. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321.
33. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1108 (3d ed. 1998) (“The Supreme Court has not yet provided any precise definition of the ‘prejudice’ half of the ‘cause and prejudice’ exception to the procedural default doctrine.”). This is particularly troublesome because, as the Liebman treatise goes on to explain,
there are several possible definitions of “prejudice.” See id. at 1109-11.
34. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
35. Id.; Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (“[T]he failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the [cause] requirement is
met.”); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982) (rejecting defendant’s habeas petition
on the grounds that the legal basis of his constitutional claim was available at the time of his
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cials somehow interfered with the petitioner’s ability to comply with
the state procedural rule.36
As a practical matter, these hurdles are difficult to overcome.
With regard to the first exception, the Court has made it clear that
“[a]ttorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not
constitute cause for a procedural default,”37 and the Court’s standard
for constitutional ineffectiveness under Strickland v. Washington38 is a
39
notoriously onerous one. Few litigants will therefore be able to use
this basis for establishing cause. In addition, because the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel applies only during trial
and the first appeal of right,40 an attorney’s negligence in failing to
raise a claim during state postconviction review or in federal habeas
proceedings can never constitute “cause”—even though some constitutional claims cannot be raised at any prior time.41

trial).
36. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953); see also Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,
217-22 (1988) (holding that the district attorney’s failure to turn over a memorandum detailing
discriminatory practices in jury selection constituted “cause” that excused the petitioner’s previous failure to raise a challenge to the composition of the jury).
37. Reed, 477 U.S. at 492.
38. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”).
39. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (“Strickland’s critics rightly
claim that the current right-to-counsel doctrine is dysfunctional.”); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 148 (1995) (“[M]any instances of dreadful lawyering are found to
be acceptable [under Strickland].”).
40. The Supreme Court recognized a due process right to counsel during a criminal defendant’s first appeal of right in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). That right encompasses
the right to competent counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (“A first appeal as
of right . . . is not adjudicated in accord with due process if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.”). The Court has declined to extend any constitutional right to
counsel to discretionary appeals. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). It is doubtful that
any constitutional right exists for collateral review either. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when
mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . and we decline to so hold today. Our
cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no
further.”). Because “the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the right to
counsel itself,” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397 n.7, petitioners whose counsel is ineffective on discretionary or collateral review are unable to establish “cause” on the basis of constitutional ineffectiveness.
41. A defendant whose appellate counsel errs on direct appeal, for example, cannot usually
raise an ineffective assistance claim until postconviction review begins and the defendant has
new (or no) counsel.
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The second exception will also rarely be available because any
constitutional claim sufficiently novel to meet the “cause” standard is
also likely to be considered a “new rule” under the Supreme Court’s
nonretroactivity doctrine, which does not permit defendants to avail
themselves of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure, that is,
those handed down after their convictions become final.42 This leaves
the third exception as the sole viable means of establishing “cause,”
but cases of state interference with an attorney’s ability to comply
with state procedural rules are both unusual and difficult to prove. 43
The Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Rose v. Lundy44 further
complicates the interplay between the doctrines of exhaustion, procedural default, and the doctrine of abusive petitions, which usually requires a habeas petitioner to bring all of his claims in his first habeas
petition.45 In Rose, the Court adopted a rule of “total exhaustion”: a
habeas petition containing both exhausted claims and unexhausted
claims must be dismissed in its entirely.46 This rule forces the habeas petitioner into a difficult decision—withdraw the entire petition,
try to exhaust the unexhausted claims, and return to federal court
months or years later; or, proceed solely with the exhausted claims by
dropping the unexhausted claims, in the hopes of exhausting them

42. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-16 (1989) (plurality). For a more complete discussion of Teague, see infra Part II.A.3. Cases where the factual basis of a claim is unavailable
will usually fall into one of two camps—when the defendant’s counsel fails to find the facts (in
which case the first “cause” exception applies) or when the state interferes with the defendant’s
ability to find the facts (in which case the final “state interference” exception applies).
43. They are not unheard of, however. In Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), for example, the Supreme Court found that a capital defendant established “cause” for failing to raise a
claim of grand jury discrimination because the state had failed to hand over a memorandum instructing the jury commissioners on how to select grand jurors so as to ensure the underrepresentation of minority jurors. See id. at 217-22. Claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), similarly involve suppression of information by state officials. Because Brady claims by
definition involve a prosecutor’s failure to give the defendant exculpatory evidence in the state’s
possession, however, a Brady violation will not usually relate to a habeas petitioner’s failure to
meet a procedural bar.
44. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
45. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). In McCleskey, the Supreme Court adopted
for abusive petitions the same standard that governs procedural defaults. See id. at 493 (“[T]he
standard for excusing a failure to raise a claim at the appropriate time should be the same in
both [the procedural default and abusive petition] contexts.”). As a result, the “cause” and
“prejudice” and “miscarriage of justice” standards discussed above, see supra text accompanying
notes 27-36, controlled. Amendments to the habeas statutes pursuant to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) may have changed the parity of doctrine. See
infra note 204.
46. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19 (plurality).
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later.47 A petitioner opting to withdraw the petition entirely delays
any relief and may likely miss the newly enacted, one-year limitations
period for filing habeas petitions,48 while a petitioner opting to proceed solely with his exhausted claims “would risk forfeited consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal court” when he files a second habeas petition containing the later-exhausted claims.49
As this brief discussion illustrates, the interaction of the doctrines
of exhaustion, procedural default, and abusive petitions has created a
very elaborate set of procedural hurdles that must be negotiated before a state prisoner’s claims may be heard by a federal court on habeas. To be sure, none of these doctrines technically restricts the substantive scope of habeas, because any petitioner able enough to
navigate these procedural straits successfully is entitled to review of
the merits of her federal constitutional claims. In practical terms,
however, these procedural hurdles end up precluding or greatly delaying resolution of the merits in a substantial number of cases.
There is good reason to believe that this approach to curtailing
habeas is flawed. To begin with, these procedural doctrines are quite
complex.50 This complexity is especially hard on the vast majority of

47. See id. at 520-21 (discussing the two options that the “total exhaustion” rule leaves for
habeas petitioners).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply
to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court.”). A petitioner in this situation will not, however, be deemed to be filing a “second or successive petition” within the meaning of pre-AEDPA, and possibly post-AEDPA, law
when he returns to federal court with a new habeas petition containing his newly exhausted
claims. See Slack v. McDaniel, 2000 WL 478879 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2000). The Court reasoned that it
is more appropriate “to treat the initial mixed petition as though it had not been filed, subject to
whatever conditions the [District] Court [dismissing the petition] attaches to the dismissal.” Id.
at *8. Prior to Slack, the lower federal courts had been split on this issue. Compare Slack v.
McDaniel, No. CV-N-95, 194-DWH (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 1998) (unpublished opinion), reprinted in
1999 WL 297747, at *152aa, with Carlson v. Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416, 418-20 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a habeas petitioner whose first petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies would not be barred by AEDPA’s “second or successive” petition rule from refiling after
exhaustion), and McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997) (same), and In re
Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1997) (same), and Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208
(3d Cir. 1997) (same), and Dickinson v. Maine, 101 F.3d 791, 791 (1st Cir. 1996) (same), and
Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
49. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 (plurality).
50. See Baird, supra note 5, at 311 (finding these procedural doctrines “technical and cumbersome”); Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 253, 273 (claiming that “the rules governing
access to habeas review have become hopelessly . . . confused” and constitute a “widely acclaimed muddle”); Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 65, 109, 112 (1994) (noting that “[c]urrent habeas doctrine is plagued by its complexity” and “has no messier thicket than the law of defaulted claims”); Jordan Steiker, Re-

HOFFSTADT TO PRINTER4.DOC

2000]

A LEANER, CLEANER WRIT OF HABEAS

07/17/00 12:50 PM

961

habeas petitioners, who do not have counsel.51 In 1995, for example,
58.6% of the habeas petitions filed by state prisoners in federal district courts were dismissed on procedural grounds.52 A similar study of
federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners and disposed of in
1992 found that on average, 65% of the claims raised in their petitions
were dismissed on procedural grounds—57% of the claims for failure
to exhaust and another 12% of the claims for procedural default.53
These results are troubling for two reasons. First, these procedural devices reduce the availability of habeas review, but they do so
indirectly and without the legal and political debate that would occur
if the scope of claims cognizable on habeas were narrowed directly.
Second, and more troubling, is that these procedural doctrines can fit
together in ways that effectively block any review of an inmate’s substantive claims,54 and they may do so on a seemingly irrational or unfair basis. For example, two petitioners who, through no fault of their
own, defaulted claims because they could not discover the facts necessary to establish those claims would be treated differently depending on whether the state or some other party had hidden the facts. In
effect, these procedural doctrines distinguish between defendants differently based on each defendant’s respective ability to navigate the
procedural thicket, which has little or no bearing on that defendant’s
substantive entitlement to relief.

structuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners:
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 316 [hereinafter Steiker, Restructuring] (“[O]ne can lament the high cost of extraordinarily intricate procedural litigation in criminal cases.”); Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and Individualized RightsOrdering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 680 (1994) (“Habeas certainly has become a ‘confused patchwork’ of ‘petty procedural barriers.’” (quoting Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 649 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) and Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
51. A 1995 Justice Department study found that 93% of the habeas corpus cases it sampled
involved a prisoner proceeding without counsel. See HANSON & DALEY, supra note 21, at 14.
52. See JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 1980–1996, at 6 (1997).
53. See HANSON & DALEY, supra note 21, at 17. These statistics are not surprising, since
state prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel on federal habeas. See supra note 40. Persons sentenced to death have a statutory right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, see 21
U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1994), but, in all other cases, counsel may be assigned to “financially eligible” persons only if “the court determines that the interests of justice so require,” 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(a)(2) (1994).
54. See Baird, supra note 5, at 336 (“In sum, the Court has narrowed the availability of federal habeas corpus by three primary means: retroactive application [of new rules], procedural
default, and harmless error.”). For a more detailed explanation of how the doctrines fit together
to block review, see supra text accompanying notes 19-49.
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In addition to these procedural doctrines that act as threshold
barriers to federal habeas review, the Court and Congress have also
fashioned what might be called quasi-procedural mechanisms that
have the effect of reducing the likelihood that a federal habeas petition will succeed on its merits once it is heard. Until recently, a federal court reviewing a habeas petition would defer to the state courts’
findings of fact but would review de novo any purely legal questions
or mixed questions of law and fact.55 In 1996, Congress ostensibly
changed the second of these well-settled rules by foreclosing habeas
relief unless the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”56 This Term,
the Supreme Court interpreted this new language to mean just what it
says—that federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable interpretations of federal law made by state courts.57 More specifically, the
55. During this period, the factual findings of the state courts were “presumed . . . correct.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (noting presumption, but listing eight circumstances when that presumption could be rebutted); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1995) (“In
[federal habeas corpus] proceedings, § 2254(d) declares, state-court determinations of ‘a factual
issue’ ‘shall be presumed to be correct’ absent one of the enumerated exceptions.” (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (setting forth most of the criteria
ultimately adopted by Congress in § 2254(d)). By contrast, the holdings of state courts on purely
legal questions, or mixed questions of law and fact, were reviewed de novo. See Thompson, 516
U.S. at 112-13; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985); Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318 (“Although
the district judge may . . . defer to the state court’s findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of law.”). Three Justices of the Supreme Court questioned independent review of mixed
questions in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992). See id. at 288-97 (plurality opinion of Thomas,
J.).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997). The 1996 amendments retained the previous
rule of deference to state findings of fact. See id. § 2254(d)(2) (permitting an award of habeas
relief only if the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”).
57. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). The decision resolved a deep split among
the federal courts on the meaning of this language. Compare Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 924
(11th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the language to require de novo review for pure legal questions
and deferential review for mixed questions of law and fact), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 811 (1999),
and Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S.
320 (1997), and Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-69 (5th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1107 (1997), with Matteo v. Superintendent, Sci Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 885-89 (3d Cir.)
(interpreting the language to require courts to apply “contrary to” language when the Supreme
Court has prescribed a governing rule and to apply the “unreasonable application” language
where no such rule exists), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 73 (1999), and Long v. Humphrey, 184 F.3d
758, 759-61 (8th Cir. 1999) (same), and O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20-26 (1st Cir. 1998)
(same), with Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494, 500 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the language
to require courts to apply both types of analysis to cases, depending on how much they diverge
from relevant Supreme Court precedent), vacated on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 1001 (2000), and
Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 869-73 (4th Cir. 1998) (employing a similar analysis), with Hall v.
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Court held that a state court decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law” only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or
if the state court decides a case differently from [the Court] has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.”58 Similarly, a state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law” only if “the state court’s application . . . was objectively
unreasonable.”59 In making this determination, a federal habeas
court’s “conclu[sion] in its independent judgment that the relevant
state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly” is not enough—the state court’s “application
must also be unreasonable.”60
Even if a federal court reaches the merits of a claim raised on
habeas and determines that the state court erred in resolving that
claim, a habeas petitioner is not automatically entitled to relief, such
as a new trial or resentencing.61 Instead, it must usually be established
that the error affected the verdict. The Supreme Court has held that
some errors are so egregious that they are presumed to be harmful
and accordingly always require reversal. These “structural errors” include the total deprivation of counsel at trial,62 trial before a partial
judge,63 an erroneous “beyond a reasonable doubt” instruction,64 dep-

Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir.) (applying de novo review to all legal questions and to
mixed questions of law and fact), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264 (1997).
For a comprehensive discussion of this disagreement, see Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law:
Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 535, 552-93 (1999).
58. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.
59. Id. at 1521.
60. Id. at 1522. Justice Stevens, along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, disagreed
with the majority’s gloss on the 1996 amendments. In their view, the language “express[ed] a
‘mood’” that directed “federal judges to attend with the utmost care to state-court decisions,
including all of the reasons supporting their decisions, before concluding that those proceedings
were infected by constitutional error . . . .” Id. at 1509 (opinion of Stevens, J.). “Whatever ‘deference’ Congress had in mind,” Justice Stevens wrote, “it surely is not a requirement that federal courts actually defer to a state-court application of the federal law that is, in the independent judgment of the federal court, in error.” Id. at 1509-10. Such a rule would, in his view, have
trod upon “the federal courts’ independent responsibility . . . to interpret federal law.” Id. at
1505.
61. See, e.g., id. at 1505 (“It is, of course, well settled that the fact that constitutional error
occurred in the proceedings that led to a state-court conviction may not alone be sufficient reason for concluding that a prisoner is entitled to the remedy of habeas corpus.”).
62. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
63. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
64. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1993).
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rivation of the right to self-representation at trial,65 deprivation of the
right to a public trial,66 and unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury.67 Most other constitutional errors
are considered “trial errors.”68
On direct appeal, a criminal defendant who successfully establishes that her constitutional trial rights were violated is entitled to
relief unless the state can prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[constitutional trial] error complained of did not contribute to the
69
verdict obtained.” Until 1993, it was generally accepted that the
rules for evaluating whether a trial error was harmless on direct appeal also applied on federal habeas.70 In Brecht v. Abrahamson,71
however, the Supreme Court held that a habeas petitioner must prove
that the constitutional error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict’” before he might obtain
relief,72 except that, as later indicated by O’Neal v. McAninch,73 any
65. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984).
66. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-48 (1984).
67. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986). The admission of an involuntary
confession was also considered grounds for automatic reversal of a conviction until 1991. Compare Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958), with Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
309-12 (1991).
68. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (“[T]he Court . . . has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless.”).
69. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
70. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402-07 (1991) (applying the Chapman standard
on federal habeas); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79 (1986) (same); Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972) (same); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 525 (1968) (per curiam)
(same).
71. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
72. Id. at 631 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also id. at
637 (ruling that “habeas petitioners . . . are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice’” (quoting United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438, 449 (1986)) (emphasis added)). The Brecht standard is identical to the standard announced by the Supreme Court for reviewing nonconstitutional errors on direct review of federal convictions. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776 (announcing that the test for considering a postconviction variance postconviction is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect on
the jury’s verdict”). The Kotteakos standard itself was derived from a federal criminal statute
and a rule of federal criminal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994) (“On the hearing of any
appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).
The Court in Brecht retained the rule of automatic reversal for structural errors. See
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30. It also noted that its new “harmless error” standard might apply in
some situations not involving structural errors. More specifically, the Court recognized the
possibility that in an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the
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uncertainty about whether a petitioner meets this standard is to be resolved in favor of granting relief.74 By increasing the threshold for obtaining relief, the Brecht standard—like the other doctrines discussed
in this part—leaves the substantive scope of habeas intact while
making habeas relief less available. 75
As this part illustrates, judges and legislators intent on curtailing
the availability of federal habeas corpus have two options. They can
erect procedural and quasi-procedural barriers that, while technically
leaving the substantive scope of the writ untouched, nevertheless render habeas relief beyond the reach of most state prisoners, particularly when so many of them proceed pro se.76 Alternatively, those intent on restricting the writ may choose to narrow the substantive
scope of the writ explicitly and may thereby more actively (and rationally) control which cases are relitigated on habeas. This Article
now explores various ways of doing so.
II. NARROWING THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE
When explicitly considering narrowing the scope of the federal
habeas writ, it is important to be aware of the broader considerations
trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might
so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even
if it did not influence the jury’s verdict.
Id. at 638 n.9.
73. 513 U.S. 432 (1995).
74. See id. at 436 (“When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about
whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless.” (quoting O’Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 145
(1993) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627))).
The federal courts of appeals are currently divided on whether Chapman still applies on
habeas in cases where the federal court is the first court to review the claim (that is, where the
state courts have not had an opportunity to review it). One circuit has held that Chapman
should apply in this situation. See Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993). The
majority of remaining circuits have held that Brecht applies in this situation. See Gilliam v.
Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1999); Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 953 (3d Cir.
1998); Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 498-500 (5th Cir. 1997); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134,
1141 (4th Cir. 1996); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1515-16 (10th Cir. 1995); Tyson v. Trigg,
50 F.3d 436, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1995); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1995).
Two circuits have dodged the issue. See Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1999);
Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. Several commentators are vehemently opposed to this curtailment of habeas. See, e.g.,
Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 495 (criticizing Brecht for making it more difficult
for petitioners to obtain relief); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2331, 2410 (1993) (“The diluted standard for constitutional trial errors is hostile to the very nature of the federal courts’ jurisdiction in habeas corpus.”).
76. See supra note 52.
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that inform the public policy decision to narrow the writ. These considerations favor the creation of a narrower writ that rests upon a
considered theory of habeas and that yields what society deems to be
fair and consistent outcomes. Congress has several options when deciding which federal constitutional claims may be relitigated on habeas. Four basic approaches have been advanced in judicial opinions
and in the academic literature—from using the writ solely as a backstop for failures in state review to confining prisoners to the law as it
existed at some time in the past. This part identifies these approaches
and concludes that Congress should delineate which federal constitutional claims may be relitigated on habeas and should allow those
claims to be raised based on the current law, regardless of their prior
litigation in state court. This part then reviews the five primary ways
in which Congress might select the constitutional claims subject to
relitigation on habeas and finds that claims should be chosen based
on how fundamental they are to the fairness of the criminal justice
process, keeping in mind the function of the writ of habeas corpus as
a final layer of appeal after state court review.
A. The Broader Questions
When Congress considers amending the statute that defines the
substantive scope of the federal writ of habeas corpus as it applies to
state prisoners, it is undertaking a largely normative task. Over the
past 130 years, the federal courts have been limited to asking, “What
can the scope be in light of the statutory text?”77 Congress, however,
has a much wider berth and may inquire, “What should the scope
be?”78
As a result, Congress may delve into more fundamental questions, such as whether federal habeas review should be provided at
all. The answer to that question is undoubtedly yes. To be sure, federal habeas review is not without cost. Allowing a lower federal court
to review the judgments of state supreme courts is perceived by many
to be an affront to state sovereignty.79 The Supreme Court has also
77. In light of Congress’s refusal to amend the statutory language of the writ since 1867, it
is not surprising that the battle over the substantive scope of the writ has taken place in the
courts. See Baird, supra note 5, at 299 (“The scope of the writ of habeas corpus has been defined
more by judicial decision than by statute.”).
78. Of course, Congress’s normative inquiry is still bounded by the Constitution’s Suspension of the Writ Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Constitution’s limits are discussed infra
at Part V.
79. Section 2254’s requirement that the habeas petition be “in custody,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254
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repeatedly observed that federal habeas review undermines the finality of state convictions80 and takes up valuable federal judicial resources.81
Federal habeas review is nevertheless appropriate. Federal court
review of state convictions is likely to ferret out federal constitutional
violations that the state courts have missed, allowing habeas to serve
as an important bulwark in protecting those rights deemed vital
enough to be cognizable on habeas. The existence of federal habeas
review of at least some constitutional claims also provides a forum for
the development of federal constitutional law that would otherwise
be confined to the United States Supreme Court’s review of convictions on direct appeal.82 Such review may, as a final matter, be constitutionally required, as the constitutional prohibition against suspension of the writ would, at a minimum, appear to imply the existence of
the writ.83
Congress may also ask whether the writ, once established, should
reach all federal constitutional claims. There are several reasons why
Congress might want to have the federal courts relitigate all federal
constitutional violations. By placing no violation beyond the scrutiny
of the federal courts, the federal courts would surely be more likely to
uncover all possible constitutional violations and to deter state actors
(Supp. III 1997), links habeas relief to the state prisoner’s challenge to her conviction or sentence because, in the postconviction context, the prisoner is almost always “in custody” pursuant to the conviction or sentence. Thus, federal habeas in this context is actually a tool for attacking final state judgments of conviction.
80. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (emphasizing the “State’s interest
in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system”);
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 426 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“At some point in time,
the State’s interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner’s interest in yet another round of litigation.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality) (recognizing that finality is “essential to the operation of our criminal justice system”); see also Friedman, Failed Enterprise,
supra note 9, at 528 (“Probably at the top of the Supreme Court’s own list of priorities is finality.”).
81. In 1995, for example, federal and state prison inmates filed over 14,000 habeas corpus
petitions. See SCALIA, supra note 52, at 3.
82. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right
to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 866 (1994) [hereinafter
Steiker, Incorporating] (“Were the lower courts not enlisted in the effort [of interpreting federal
constitutional law], federal habeas would surely cease to exist as an effective remedy for state
prisoners.”); see also Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus & the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (arguing that the Warren Court’s indulgence of large-scale relitigation of constitutional claims in federal court helped to create a
dialogue between federal and state courts on federal constitutional law).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also infra Part V (discussing the Suspension of the
Writ Clause in greater detail).
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(including state courts) from committing violations in the first place.84
Such broad review might have costs over and above those attendant
to narrower review, however, and might end up harming the state
prisoners it is designed to help. Not foreclosing any constitutional
claim (or any frivolous claim recast as a constitutional violation) from
review may provoke a greater volume of meritless claims, and, as Ju stice Jackson observed, “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.”85 This Article
takes no position on the wisdom of narrowing the substantive scope
of habeas, which is a debate that predates Stone v. Powell86 and the
modern debate over the contours of the writ’s substantive scope. Instead, the Article assumes that the policy judgment to narrow the writ
has already been made and concentrates on the best way to proceed
with that policy.
The next question to ask is whether there is anything wrong with
taking an ad hoc approach to narrowing the substantive scope of habeas. After all, as discussed more fully below, the Supreme Court has
arguably failed to hew a straight course when excluding claims from
habeas review, particularly in its decisions to exclude Fourth
Amendment claims but to retain Miranda claims.87
There are good reasons not to follow the Court’s lead in this regard. As an initial matter, the Court’s handiwork has not met with
widespread approval, even among those who believe it is appropriate
to narrow the writ’s scope.88 More importantly, however, having a coherent theory underlie any revisions to habeas respects state sovereignty, an issue that goes to the core of federal habeas review.89 As
the Court has noted time and again, habeas review by federal courts
is a substantial intrusion on state sovereignty, one that requires justification.90 If Congress lacks a cogent theory to guide its reformation of
the writ’s scope and permits state convictions to be overturned on
84. This argument underlies the “deterrence theory” of habeas discussed more fully infra
at Part II.B.2.
85. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
86. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
87. See infra Part II.B.3. By contrast, Congress, in the plain language of § 2254(a), has arguably followed a consistent theory—namely, that review of all federal constitutional claims is
warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Supp. III 1997).
88. See infra Part II.B.3.
89. State sovereignty is implicated most directly because the grant of habeas relief by a
federal court overturns a state conviction or sentence. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text.
90. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 528-29.
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some subset of federal constitutional grounds that is selected on an ad
hoc basis, the federal intrusion on the finality of state judgments—
and, consequently, on state sovereignty itself—would seem to be less
justified than if that subset were selected after considered judgments
by a Congress working from a cogent theory of habeas. Lastly, having
a consistent theory makes sense as a practical matter. If Congress
chooses, as it often does in other contexts, to refine the substantive
scope of the writ one step at a time, a consistent theory would provide
a ready blueprint for future legislative action and would consequently
give Congress greater freedom to act in a piecemeal fashion. The Article now turns to the task of evaluating the possible theories that
might support a narrower writ.
B. Approaches to Narrowing Habeas
There are several possible ways to distinguish constitutional
claims that may be relitigated on habeas from those that may not. At
one extreme, Congress could close the habeas courts to all constitutional claims, except those that the petitioner was not given a “full
and fair opportunity” to present in state court.91 A second, less polar
option is to permit the federal courts to hear any constitutional claim
but to have the courts’ ability to hear a claim turn on whether the
claim is accompanied by a colorable showing of actual innocence.92 A
third option is to allow a petitioner to raise any constitutional claim,
but only under the relevant law that existed at some time in the past
(for instance, when the petitioner’s conviction became final).93 Finally,
Congress could simply decide ahead of time which constitutional
claims a petitioner may relitigate on habeas. Those constitutional
claims would then always be cognizable on habeas (regardless of the
petitioner’s innocence, what happened in state court, and what the
law was at some prior point in time). Each method of restricting habeas, along with its benefits and drawbacks, will be discussed in turn.

91. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456 (1963). Along these same lines, Senator Jon Kyl introduced a bill
during the last session of Congress that would have foreclosed federal habeas review “unless the
remedies in the courts of the State are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention of the person.” Crime Prevention Act of 1997, S. 488, 105th Cong., § 601(a).
92. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
93. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-09 (1989) (plurality).
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1. Full and Fair Opportunity Approach. This approach to
federal habeas, first espoused by Professor Paul Bator in his seminal
1963 article, starts from the premise that the writ of habeas
corpus itself is an historical exception to the general rule of res
judicata, which would normally bar federal courts from reviewing
judgments of the state courts.94
This approach rests heavily on a particular reading of the history
of the writ in America. At common law, Bator recounts, the writ of
habeas corpus assured little more than a conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction.95 The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the writ for
federal prisoners and, by failing to define any broader scope, seemingly incorporated the common law’s narrow writ.96 Although the Reconstruction Congress amended the statutory language to reach “all
cases where any person may be restrained . . . in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States,”97 the Supreme
Court did not expand the writ much beyond jurisdictional inquiries
until the early twentieth century.98 At that point, the Court began to
entertain constitutional challenges to convictions if a state’s corrective

94. Admittedly, § 2254 purports to test the legality of a state prisoner’s “custody.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Supp. III 1997) (“The [federal courts] . . . shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” (emphasis added)). In most cases, testing a prisoner’s “custody” involves a challenge to his underlying conviction. But because habeas focuses on custody, habeas is also available to challenge the constitutionality of prison disciplinary sanctions if they affect the length or
duration of a prisoner’s sentence. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (recognizing
that habeas is the proper remedy when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-47
(1997) (same).
95. See Bator, supra note 91, at 466 (noting that, soon after 1789, “the Supreme Court accept[ed] the black-letter principle of the common law that the writ was simply not available at
all to one convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction”); Peller, supra note 5, at
610-16 (objecting to Bator’s explanation for the writ’s narrow scope, though not disagreeing
with Bator’s characterization of the narrow scope of the writ during this period).
96. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the courts of the United States “shall have
power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
97. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 373, 385 (1867).
98. To be sure, there is considerable academic debate about whether the Supreme Court’s
stingy interpretation of the writ during this period was the product of a narrow view of the writ
of habeas corpus or a consequence of the fact that the Constitution at that time had not been
broadly interpreted to guarantee any more than the jurisdiction of the convicting court. Compare Bator, supra note 91, at 471-85 (developing the historical argument that the Supreme Court
viewed habeas narrowly), with Peller, supra note 5, at 621-30 (claiming that, historically, “[t]he
state court’s jurisdiction was relevant only to the merits of the due process claim, not the jurisdiction of the habeas court”).
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procedures were inadequate.99 It was not until 1953, however, in
100
Brown v. Allen, that the Supreme Court interpreted section 2254 to
permit relitigation of constitutional claims previously raised in state
courts.101
Bator reasons that because the Supreme Court had not (until the
102
early 1900s) viewed habeas as a writ of error, the writ was—and,
under this view, still should be—generally unavailable for relitigating
constitutional claims because such relitigation could upset a final
judgment of conviction. Thus, the only time it would be appropriate
to revisit a conviction through habeas is when there were some defect
with the state court’s process of review. As Bator puts it, “if a job can
be well done once, it should not be done twice.”103 This would leave
the writ open only to state prisoners able to demonstrate that “the
processes furnished by the previous [state] tribunal were [not] meaningful and rational.”104
There are several reasons why Congress may not wish to codify
Bator’s “full and fair opportunity” approach when retooling the federal writ. Initially, it rests on the general assumption that state judges
are as competent as federal judges in litigating federal constitutional
claims (thereby negating any need for federal error correction). It is
unclear whether this assumption of parity is valid, however. Academics and politicians are sharply divided on this issue.105 Basing the
99. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) (reasoning that, “if the State, supplying
no corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a
verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty
without due process of law” and arguing that habeas might therefore be appropriate); see also
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1923) (following the Frank rule and remanding for determination of whether the state corrective process was adequate).
100. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
101. See id. at 460-65.
102. See Bator, supra note 91, at 471 (“The essential touchstone [of the Court’s precedent]
continued to be that the writ of habeas corpus was not to be used as a writ of error . . . .”).
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id. at 456. Bator would also permit habeas petitioners to challenge the jurisdiction of
the state court, see id. at 460-62, but the rarity of state proceedings lacking jurisdiction renders
the “failure of process” exception, id. at 455, the primary avenue for review under his model.
105. As Professor Chemerinsky astutely observed, “in the academic literature, much of the
disagreement over the scope of habeas corpus is based on differing views of the relative competence of federal and state courts.” Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 764; see also Barry Friedman,
Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 819 (1992) [hereinafter Friedman, Habeas and Hubris] (“Parity, however, is a controversial topic. Academics debate whether parity really exists.”); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 634 (1993) (“Whether
state courts are as effective as federal courts in enforcing federal rights remains a central issue.”). Compare Bator, supra note 91, at 509 (“There is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a
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writ on such a contested premise may be unwise. On a more practical
level, the “full and fair” approach would require federal courts to inquire into the sufficiency and fairness of state court procedures. Many
view this type of probing into the procedures of a state court system
as more offensive to state courts than simple error correction,106 although, in its defense, it is arguably no worse than the routine inquiry
courts engage in when determining whether to grant the findings of
other courts preclusive effect.107 Finally, even those Supreme Court
Justices who are sympathetic to this approach nevertheless acknowledge that it still may be appropriate for federal courts to review the
merits of some constitutional claims.108 Consequently, this approach
may narrow the writ too much, beyond what even the advocates of
man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applicable federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse.”), and Friendly,
supra note 92, at 165 & n.26 (rejecting the notion that state judges are less competent than federal judges), with Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L. Q.
15, 202 (“In enacting [the 1867 habeas] statute, the 39th Congress essentially made a legislative
finding that state courts are less trustworthy in the vindication of civil rights and civil liberties
than federal courts.”), and Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21
(1977) (arguing that federal judges have greater “technical competence,” a superior “psychological set,” and better insulation from the majoritarian processes because of their life tenure),
and Peller, supra note 5, at 677 (“[I]f state and federal judges were equally sensitive to federal
constitutional requirements, there would be little need for federal courts to review state court
decisions . . . .”).
Congress also grapples with this issue. During this session, the House passed the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, which would move nearly all state court class actions
to federal court. See H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. Much of the impetus behind this legislation stems
from the belief that state court judges are not competent to handle the complexities of class action litigation. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-320, at 9 (1999) (justifying the bill as necessary to counteract “[t]he lax attitudes of some State courts and those courts’ ineffectiveness in managing
class action litigation”).
106. See Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 540 (“It is difficult to think of an approach more inherently damaging to the notion of comity than to invite the federal courts into
the state proceedings, to ensure the state judges provided a ‘full and fair hearing.’”); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 777-78 & n.157 (arguing that a “full and fair” approach may produce greater friction between state and federal courts); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at
1043 (regarding as problematic the “potentially insulting inquiries into the reasons for the failure of the [state] trial judge to raise and correct errors not called to his attention by the defense”).
107. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (“Since the petitioners received a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate their claims in the [prior] action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are
collaterally estopped from relitigating [the legal question at issue].”).
108. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Prior
opportunity to litigate an issue should be an important equitable consideration in any habeas
case, and should ordinarily preclude the court from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes
to the fairness of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result.” (second emphasis
added)).
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the most sweeping habeas reform contemplate. Thus, although this
approach rests on a coherent theory, it has practical difficulties, and it
may go too far in curtailing the writ.109
2. The “Colorable Innocence” Approach. Articulated most
ardently by Judge Henry Friendly, this approach would permit a state
prisoner to raise any federal constitutional claim on federal habeas as
long as the prisoner can show “a fair probability that, in light of all
the evidence . . . the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable
doubt of his guilt.”110 The underlying rationale for this approach is
that substantiation of guilt or innocence is “vital” in “determining
whether collateral relief should be available to a convicted
defendant.”111
Despite this laudable and coherent rationale, this approach has
several drawbacks. First, it does not recognize innocence as an independent basis for release on habeas. Instead, a colorable showing of
innocence acts solely as a gateway into federal court for petitioners
109. This theory also rests on a historical pedigree that is refutable. See Peller, supra note 5
(defending a broader interpretation of federal habeas review against the Burger Court’s restrictive reading). Academics have generally conceded that the history of the writ does not clearly
reflect—or, more relevant to current academic discourse, support—any single theory of habeas.
See, e.g., Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 50, at 74 (“[T]he habeas statute simply does not speak
to any of the key issues in habeas law . . . [and] does not define habeas’s substantive scope.”); id.
at 79 (noting that the history of the writ of habeas is unhelpful); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse
Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1997, 2033 (1992) (observing that the historical debate between Professors Bator and Peller “ends in an uninformative draw, as neither thesis can explain important [Supreme Court]
decisions that both theses must explain in order to convince”); McCord, supra note 5, at 738
(“[D]epending on which piece of history one grasps, the writ takes on an entirely different cha racter.”); Woolhandler, supra note 105, at 643 (“[H]istory does not necessarily dictate a particular result in the current debate as to the proper scope of habeas . . . .”).
110. Friendly, supra note 92, at 160. The evidence to be considered in this inquiry includes
evidence “alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it)
and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only
after the trial.” Id.
Judge Friendly did not advocate a pure “colorable innocence” approach, however. He
would have waived the requisite showing for: (i) petitioners whose “[habeas] attack concerns
the very basis of the criminal process” (e.g., claims of deprivation of counsel, racial discrimination in jury selection, excess publicity, and improper influences on a court officer); (ii) petitioners who can show that there has been no prior full and fair opportunity to raise a constitutional
claim, which would encompass cases where “collateral attack is the only avenue for the defendant to vindicate his rights”; (iii) cases “where the state has failed to provide proper procedure
for making a defense at trial and on appeal”; and (iv) petitioners whose claims involve “[n]ew
constitutional developments relating to criminal procedure.” Id. at 152-53.
111. Id. at 142 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
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wishing to raise federal constitutional claims that may or may not be
related to the accuracy of the underlying guilty verdict or to their actual guilt or innocence. In this respect, this approach would adopt for
all habeas review a “miscarriage of justice” exception similar to the
one that the Supreme Court currently uses as a gateway to overcome
procedural defaults and successive habeas petitions.112 Under this approach, it is possible—and, indeed, foreseeable—that a petitioner’s
constitutional claim might be rejected, even though she made the
requisite “colorable showing of innocence.” In this situation, a prisoner who had effectively established a reasonable likelihood that she
were innocent would be denied relief and remain in prison notwithstanding this showing.113 By making innocence the primary focus of
access, but making the merit of constitutional claims the focus of relief, this approach is somewhat at odds with itself, and it might lead to
results that appear unfair.
To be sure, Congress could remedy this internal inconsistency by
enacting a writ that views innocence both as a gateway to review of all
constitutional claims and as an independent basis for relief. This approach has a common-sense appeal to it: habeas would be reserved
for the innocent, not for those hoping to “get off on a technicality.”
Even a writ structured along these lines would not solve all of the
problems with an innocence-based focus, however. First, such a writ,
as one would expect, places almost exclusive weight on a petitioner’s
innocence. While protection of the innocent is clearly a value enshrined in the Constitution, it is not the only value. Several constitutional guarantees, including many of those considered to be so important that breaches thereof are deemed “structural error,” protect
procedural regularity and have little or nothing to do with the accuracy of the guilty verdict.114 Because these protections would likely be
unavailable on habeas under this approach, some of the “legal techni112. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (discussing the “miscarriage of justice” exception to the procedural default doctrine, which requires a showing that a constitutional violation “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent”);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-96 (1991) (recognizing the same exception to the “abuse”
of the writ and “successive” writ doctrines); see also supra text accompanying notes 29-32, 45.
113. See Steiker, Restructuring, supra note 50, at 327 (stating that the “colorable showing of
innocence” approach turns habeas on its head).
114. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination
in grand jury selection warrants automatic reversal even if the trial itself is free from error and
the verdict presumably accurate); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986)
(“The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike.”).
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calities” that this approach would effectively nullify on habeas are
some of the most essential process-oriented protections of the Constitution. Second, this approach would require an individualized, caseby-case examination of each habeas petitioner’s innocence, turning
the writ into little more than a vehicle for assessing error in a verdict.115 This would constitute a great shift in the function of the federal
habeas courts, which until now have devoted more effort to evaluating the merits of legal claims raised by habeas petitioners than to
sifting through the raw facts and reassessing guilt. As these criticisms
highlight, the theoretical and practical impact of the “colorable innocence” approach makes it less than ideal for undergirding a new, cohesive statutory writ.
3. The Temporal Approach. A third option, already adopted by
the Supreme Court, is to limit habeas petitioners to raising constitutional claims available to them at some time in the past—usually,
when their convictions became “final” at the conclusion of direct review. In Teague v. Lane,116 the Court announced the current law that
governs the circumstances under which prisoners litigating state or
federal habeas petitions would be able to avail themselves of favorable precedent handed down after their direct appeals concluded.
Prior to Teague, the Court followed an individualized approach to the
question of retroactivity, evaluating for each new precedent “the purpose to be served by the new standards,” “the extent of the reliance
by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,” and “the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards.”117 Teague moved away from this individualized approach
and adopted a categorical rule regarding the retroactivity of decisions
handed down after a prisoner’s direct appeal is over and collateral review has begun.118

115. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at 1089 (“A case-by-case focus would degenerate into a weaker variant of the constitutional harmless error rule.”).
116. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
117. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). This tripartite test is commonly referred to
as the Linkletter standard, after Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the case in which it
was first announced.
118. Just two years earlier, the Court had adopted a categorical rule permitting prisoners
litigating their direct appeals to rely upon newly announced precedent. See Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (stressing that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to
be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final”).
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Under Teague’s regime, subsequent decisions that announce
“new rules”—as opposed to decisions that merely clarify prior precedent—should not generally “be applied retroactively to cases on col119
lateral review.” As a result, state prisoners filing state or federal habeas petitions cannot usually rely upon any “new rules” of
constitutional criminal procedure in seeking relief.
Teague’s anti-retroactivity rule is a broad one. A rule is considered “new” any time it “breaks new ground [or] imposes a new obligation on the States or Federal Government” or if it was not “dictated” or “compelled” by existing precedent at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.120 Put another way, a rule is
“old”—that is, available on habeas—only if “it can be said that a state
court, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, would have
acted objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later
sought in federal court.”121 Given these definitions, there are few
changes in precedent that do not constitute “new rules” barred by
Teague.
Teague does contain two exceptions, however.122 A “new rule”
may be applied retroactively on habeas if it “forbid[s] criminal punishment of certain primary conduct [or] prohibit[s] a certain category
of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,”123 or if it is a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”124
In the decade since Teague was announced, the Court has only once
found a rule fitting within the first exception;125 no “new rule” has yet

119. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
120. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1989) (“[O]ur task is to determine whether a
state court considering [a habeas petitioner’s] claim at the time his conviction became final
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [that the petitioner]
seeks was required by the Constitution.”); accord Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 526
(1997) (quoting the above language from Saffle); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166 (1997)
(same); Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (holding that “a case announces a new rule if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final”).
121. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997).
122. As the Court notes in Teague, these exceptions are derived from Justice Harlan’s
opinions in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
Teague, 489 U.S. at 304.
123. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
124. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495).
125. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (holding that a “new rule” barring the execution of mentally
retarded persons fits within Teague’s first exception).
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satisfied the second exception.126 Teague—or a harsher variant
thereof—was codified by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).127

126. See O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 167 (holding that the rule entitling a death-eligible defendant to
a jury instruction telling the jury that he is ineligible for parole would be a “new rule” that does
not meet Teague’s second exception); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1997) (holding that
the rule requiring the state to give notice to a defendant of the evidence it plans to present at a
sentencing hearing would be a “new rule” that does not satisfy Teague’s second exception);
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (1997) (holding that the rule governing relief available
when judge and jury weigh invalid aggravating factors when handing down a death sentence
would be “new,” but not a “watershed,” rule); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120 (1995)
(holding that the rule granting substantive due process protection against the required dismissal
of a fugitive’s appeal would be a “new” rule that is not “so central” as to fit within Teague’s second exception); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994) (holding that the double jeopardy
rule preventing a state from twice subjecting a defendant to a noncapital sentencing hearing
would be a “new,” but not a “watershed,” rule); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993)
(holding that the rule requiring an express jury instruction that precluded the jury from returning a murder conviction if it concluded that the defendant possessed a mitigating mental state
would be “new,” but not a “watershed,” rule); Graham, 506 U.S. at 478 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment due process right not to have a sentencing jury follow the state’s threequestion procedure would be a “new rule” that is not a “watershed rule”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U.S. 227, 241-43 (1990) (holding that the Eighth Amendment rule prohibiting the imposition of
a death sentence by a sentencer with a false sense of responsibility would be a “new rule,” but
not a “watershed” rule); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (holding that the rule that
the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel in a separate investigation is a “new rule,” but not a “watershed” rule); Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 495 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment right to allow a jury to base its sentencing decision on sympathy is not a “watershed rule”); Teague, 489 U.S. at 314-15 (plurality)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a representative petit jury would be a “new rule”
not falling within the ambit of the second exception); see also Yeager, supra note 50, at 700 (“Of
the seven claims to which the Court . . . applied Teague’s second exception to nonretroactivity
[in 1994], none . . . satisfied it.”); Joanne T. Hannaway, Note, O’Dell v. Netherland: A Bedrock
Principle of Fundamental Fairness?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 943, 982 (1998) (emphasizing that,
“since Teague, no Supreme Court case has ever found a rule to qualify under Teague’s second
exception”). A few lower federal courts have, however, identified some constitutional rights
fitting within Teague’s exception. See Hannaway, supra, at 963 n.145 (listing cases in which
lower courts have found a new rule to satisfy Teague’s second exception).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997) provides :
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Both judges and professors are unsure about the effect of this provision. See Tung Yin, A Better
Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 221 & n.116
(1998) (collecting citations illustrating the confusion of whether the provision “codifies” or “displaces” Teague).
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The adoption of a Teague-type temporal limitation as a model
for reshaping habeas has several disadvantages. To begin with, the
theory underlying this sort of temporal approach implicates the same
nettlesome “parity” debate as the “full and fair opportunity” approach.128 By limiting habeas petitioners to the federal law that they
could have cited on direct appeal, Congress might be highlighting the
notion that habeas exists solely to police the state courts’ compliance
with federal law, which implies they need such supervision.129 Indeed,
the Supreme Court noted the “deterrence function” of habeas in
130
Teague itself.
While deterrence itself is an internally consistent rationale, it
may not be well suited as a theoretical foundation for habeas because
it implies the incompetence of state actors and because any deterrent
effect from overturning convictions on habeas may come too late or
131
too sporadically to be effective. The latter rationale—that reversals
on habeas months and years after wrongful behavior are often ineffective deterrents—was cited by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell,132 when it held that Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims
should usually not be heard on habeas.133 Furthermore, a temporal
limitation on claims that binds habeas courts to the law as it existed
on a past date prevents those courts from assisting in the evolution of
the law of federal constitutional criminal procedure, which leaves a

128. See supra Part II.A.1.
129. See Yin, supra note 127, at 207 (“Teague is premised largely on grounds of finality and
deterrence.”).
130. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)):
“[T]he threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent
with established constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed
at the time the original proceedings took place.”
131. See Lee, supra note 105, at 175-76 (arguing that “the deterrence argument [in Teague]
was little more than a makeweight” and was later rejected in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993)); see also SCALIA, supra note 52, at 6 (observing that only 1.2% of the 11,841 habeas
petitions filed in federal district court by state prisoners were granted). Of course, these criticisms are themselves not above reproach. The very purpose of incorporation was to interpose
the Constitution between state actors and criminal defendants. Moreover, the low grant rate for
habeas may simply reflect the fact that the deterrent function of federal habeas is, in fact, succeeding.
132. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
133. See id. at 493 (1976) (reasoning that “the additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to
the costs”).
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greater part of that task to the Supreme Court.134 Finally, a temporal
rule may yield unfair results. Whether a particular prisoner may avail
himself of a new constitutional rule that may warrant his relief could
ultimately turn on whether the Supreme Court denied certiorari from
his direct appeal on the third of November, instead of on the third of
October. As one might expect, Teague has been roundly criticized on
all of these grounds.135 For all these reasons, a temporal limitation approach would not appear well suited to serve as a basis for reducing
the substantive scope of habeas.
4. The Claim-Based Approach. The first three approaches
would make a petitioner’s entry to a habeas court contingent upon
some factor other than the nature of the federal constitutional
objection she wishes to raise—whether the state court procedures
were adequate, whether she is innocent, or whether the particular
claim is “new” or an outgrowth of established precedent.
Alternatively, Congress could simply decide which types of
constitutional claims are sufficiently important to warrant relitigation
on habeas and which are not. Those that are could be raised on
habeas regardless of the petitioner’s actual innocence or the vintage
of her claim. Those claims that are not could not be relitigated,
although a petitioner would be free to establish that, due to
inadequacies in state procedure, she would not otherwise be able to
litigate the claim at all unless she were able to raise it before the
habeas court. As discussed more fully below, this is hardly a novel

134. See Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, supra note 105, at 799-800 (“In Teague v. Lane and
its progeny, the Supreme Court silenced the habeas courts.”); see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra
note 82, at 1036 (arguing that the Warren Court’s indulgence of large-scale relitigation of constitutional claims in federal court helped to create a dialogue between federal and state courts on
federal constitutional law); Steiker, supra note 82, at 866 (“Were the lower courts not enlisted in
the effort [of interpreting federal constitutional law], federal habeas would surely cease to exist
as an effective remedy for state prisoners.”); id. at 922 (“[T]he Court’s expansive conception of
‘new’ law has threatened to undermine lower federal courts’ ability to apply established principles to novel fact patterns.”). Of course, the Supreme Court would still not be entirely on its
own in espousing new federal constitutional law relating to prisoners, as state and federal courts
would continue to be able to expound upon the Constitution at trial and on direct appeal. A
temporal limitation on federal habeas (and under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for federal prisoners) would,
however, surely lessen the ability of these lower courts to formulate and develop federal constitutional law.
135. See Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 519 (“Teague is a disaster of judicial
administration and doctrinal development.”). See generally Yin, supra note 127, at 206 n.11
(collecting articles criticizing Teague “as being fundamentally unfair, internally inconsistent and
unreasonably harsh”).
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approach—the Supreme Court (as well as individual Justices) has
long toyed with restructuring habeas along these lines.136
Because there are several ways to pick and choose among constitutional claims, it is impossible to evaluate whether the claim-based
approach in general reflects a principled theory or yields fair results.
All claim-based approaches, however, require Congress to place constitutional rights in a hierarchy. Some rights are deemed important
enough to warrant relitigation on habeas, while others are not. Many
commentators object to this sort of “ranking” of constitutional rights.
In their view, if a constitutional right is deemed fundamental enough
to be incorporated against the states and made applicable in state trials, neither judges nor legislators are in any position to bar such
claims from habeas.137
Contrary to these objections, however, it may be perfectly acceptable for Congress to choose which of the federal constitutional
claims should be cognizable for state prisoners proceeding under the
statutory writ. At the outset, it is important to recognize that the area
of constitutional criminal procedure has expanded in the past sixty
years. The incorporation and enumeration of federal constitutional
rights has in large part converted the federal Constitution into a national code of criminal procedure.138 Now there is hardly a trial objec136. See infra Part II.B.3.
137. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 320 (“This ranking of constitutional rights
finds no basis in the habeas statute or the Constitution itself.”); see also Cover & Aleinikoff,
supra note 82, at 1087 (criticizing the Court’s decision in Stone because it established “a hierarchy of constitutional rights for purposes both of enforcement and of substantive articulation”);
Peller, supra note 5, at 599-602 (criticizing Stone and its progeny for failing to erect a meaningful
way to “identify the [constitutional] claims for which review will be unavailable”).
138. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 266 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (calling the
1960s “a decade that has witnessed revolutionary changes in the most fundamental premises of
hitherto accepted constitutional law”); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at 1036 (noting how,
in the 1960s, “[t]he Court fearlessly or foolishly brought the celebrated ideals of the federal
Constitution to bear on the day-to-day realities of urban administration of criminal justice”);
Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, supra note 105, at 798 (“Admittedly, the decades between 1950
and 1980 witnessed sea changes in the interpretations of [the] rights [guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights and the due process clause].”); Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 275 (observing
that Brown v. Allen was decided “at the beginning of the Due Process revolution” when the
Court was “broadening and spelling out the scope of substantive federal rights accorded state
prisoners”); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 50, at 67 (“Federal criminal procedure law has become in effect a detailed, national Code of Criminal Procedure that almost totally supersedes
state law.”); Steiker, Restructuring, supra note 50, at 315 (“When the Warren Court incorporated many of the provisions in the Bill of Rights and applied them against the states, the Court
significantly transformed state trials.”); Woolhandler, supra note 105, at 630 (observing that
“the Constitution gradually replaced the common law as the authority for policing ad hoc deprivations of liberty and property”).
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tion that cannot be construed to have some constitutional dimension.139
Given this expansion, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
has on occasion found it necessary (and advisable) to grant preferential treatment to some constitutional rights in various contexts.140 At
the most basic level, the Court has chosen to incorporate most—but,
importantly, not all—of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
states.141 This clearly involves the ranking of federal constitutional
rights. More relevant to the present discussion, the Court has chosen
to treat some incorporated rights more preferentially than others in
the criminal procedure area. When determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to reversal of his conviction, the Court has held that a
violation of most constitutional rights may be ignored if it is not
harmful.142 The violation of some rights, however, requires automatic
reversal regardless of the violation’s effect on the trial.143 If every one
of these “structural errors” defied harmless error analysis, one might
be able to argue that the Supreme Court was not creating a hierarchy
of rights so much as it was being merely practical. But as not all of the
“structural errors” are impervious to harmless error analysis, the
Court appears to be preferring some rights over others for constitutionally based policy reasons.144 Similarly, the Court has held that cer139. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 322 (observing that “the Constitution now
requires elaborate protections for the criminal defendant”); Friendly, supra note 92, at 156
(“Today it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a ‘constitutional’ claim.”); LIEBMAN
& HERTZ, supra note 33, at 386 (“The range of claims cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings is broad.” (citation omitted)).
140. See Yeager, supra note 50, at 675 (“[O]rdering rights is a fact of constitutional litigation.”).
141. The only criminal procedure rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Bill
of Rights, but not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, are the Fifth
Amendment’s right to a grant jury indictment, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35
(1884) (rejecting the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury protection applies to the
States), and the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against excessive fines, see Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) (reserving judgment on whether the
Excessive Fines Clause has been incorporated).
142. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (citation omitted):
Since this Court’s landmark decision in Chapman v. California, in which we adopted
the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of
a conviction, the Court has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors
and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless.
See also supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
144. For example, it seems possible to assess whether grand jury discrimination affected a
particular verdict, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statement in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986), that discrimination in grand jury selection is “structural error” in part because
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tain “watershed rules of criminal procedure” may be applied retroactively on federal habeas, even if they are “new rules.”145 In both contexts, the Court has decided that some incorporated constitutional
rights warrant special treatment.
Nor is it logically inconsistent for the Court—or Congress—to
prefer some incorporated constitutional rights over others for purposes of habeas. When the Court has held a federal constitutional
right applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has by definition expressed its view that defendants in state
criminal trials should be able to enforce that right at trial. Federal habeas review occurs much later, after the defendant has had an opporof “the difficulty of assessing its effect on any given defendant.” Id. at 264. Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s reliance on an alternative policy-based rationale in Vasquez—“[t]he overriding imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging process”—may indicate that the Court also
perceived the weakness of saying solely that the “structural error” at issue in that case defied
harmless error analysis. Id.
As to the other “structural errors,” there is more reason to credit the Court’s steadfast insistence that the error is structural because it cannot be reviewed for harmlessness. This is particularly so with the right to self-representation because, as the Court noted in McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), exercise of that right often “increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant” and thereby renders any assessment of harmfulness beside
the point. Id. at 177 n.8 (emphasis added). The remaining “structural errors” defy harmless error analysis only to the extent that a trial with those errors fails to look like a modern criminal
trial at all, so that assessing harmlessness with that proceeding as a backdrop is not meaningful.
See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (holding that errors in a reasonable doubt
instruction are per se reversible because, in cases where the instruction is erroneous, “[t]here is
no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate”); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (holding that the denial of a public trial is “structural error” in part because “‘it would be difficult to envisage a case in which [a defendant] would have evidence
available of specific injury [necessary to rebut a charge of harmlessness]’” (quoting United
States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 1969))); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (reversing conviction obtained in violation of the right to counsel,
but providing no detailed rationale for its rule of automatic reversal); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 533 (1927) (proclaiming that a verdict rendered by a judge who receives money for every
guilty verdict is invalid because of the possibility that the defendant “could not get a fair trial or
a fair sentence from one who would have so strong a motive to [convict]”).
145. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality), the Supreme Court held that the
nonretroactivity bar does not apply to “watershed rules of criminal procedure,” id. at 311, that
are
“best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus—that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor
knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods.”
Id. at 313 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted)). As one commentator noted, “[t]he two exceptions for when a rule is entitled to retroactive effect even on collateral review are consistent with a rights-selectivist vision, albeit one
with a narrow definition of what constitute[] the favored rights.” McCord, supra note 5, at 810.
As observed above, few constitutional rights meet this standard. See supra notes 123-26.

HOFFSTADT TO PRINTER4.DOC

2000]

A LEANER, CLEANER WRIT OF HABEAS

07/17/00 12:50 PM

983

tunity to assert the right at trial and on direct appeal (and perhaps in
state postconviction review). Thus, the question is no longer, “Should
this right be available to state defendants at their trials?” It already
has been. Instead, the question is, “Should state defendants be able to
relitigate an alleged violation of this federal right in federal court after they have had the opportunity to litigate it before the state
courts?” These are different questions, and it seems possible for
judges or legislators to answer them differently, but still in a consistent and logical way.146
If this objection to the claim-based approach is answered, the
next—and most vexing—question is selecting the appropriate criteria
to distinguish among constitutional rights.147
C. Selecting Which Constitutional Rights May Be Reheard on Habeas
When proceeding with a claim-based approach, it is necessary to
select a mechanism for deciding which constitutional claims may be
raised on federal habeas and which may not. This task has been called
“exceedingly difficult,”148 and it has yet to be systematically examined.149 Because Congress should only proceed to narrow the writ if
the resulting writ reflects a coherent theory, it makes sense to examine the five primary theories of habeas that have been identified in
the academic literature and by the courts and to determine whether
any of them could provide a theoretical foundation for selecting
claims for relitigation on habeas. The five major theories are: (1) the
full federal forum model; (2) the deterrence model; (3) the guilt and

146. See Bator, supra note 91, at 508-09 (disagreeing with the notion that constitutional errors are important, while all nonconstitutional errors are unimportant); Friendly, supra note 92,
at 156 (“I do challenge . . . the assumption that simply because a claim can be characterized as
‘constitutional,’ it should necessarily constitute a basis for collateral attack when there has been
fair opportunity to litigate it at trial and on appeal.”); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 50, at 92
(reasoning that “[d]ifferent kinds of constitutional claims may require different habeas rules”).
147. See Peller, supra note 5, at 599 (“Since the Court has reinterpreted the habeas statute
to not require collateral review of all constitutional claims, it is important to identify the claims
for which review will be unavailable.”); Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 911 (footnote
omitted):
Any theory that posits less than full review of all constitutional issues must offer some
basis for establishing a “hierarchy” of constitutional rights. Moreover, such a theory
must explain why the hierarchy implicit in the Court’s incorporation decisions—applying some, but not all, of the privileges in the Bill of Rights against the states—
should be modified on federal habeas.
148. Yeager, supra note 50, at 683.
149. See McCord, supra note 5, at 758-59 (remarking that “no one has attempted to define
exhausitively [sic] which rights fall within these categories”).
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innocence model; (4) the appellate model; and (5) the “fundamental
fairness” model.150 Their propriety as devices for selecting claims is
discussed next.
1. The Full Federal Forum Model. As its name suggests, this
theory views federal habeas as “a routine means by which federal
claims, both conventional and creative, can be considered in the ordinary course.”151 Given this premise, few federal statutory or constitutional claims would escape relitigation on habeas. Some proponents
of this view would permit state prisoners to relitigate claims in federal
court more than once through successive habeas petitions.152 Most
proponents, however, would allow state prisoners one opportunity to
“litigate federal claims in federal court that is roughly equivalent to
the opportunity they would have had if they had been allowed to remove the prosecution against them to federal court for original disposition.”153
150. Professor McCord had identified eight “visions of habeas”: (1) the de novo litigation
vision; (2) the appellate review vision; (3) the rights-selectivist vision; (4) the innocenceselectivist vision; (5) the one-fair-chance vision; (6) the inverse correlation vision; (7) the equitable remedy vision; and (8) the death-is-different vision. See McCord, supra note 5, at 743-86.
Professor Lee lists four primary theories of habeas: (1) the process model; (2) the innocence
model; (3) the federal forum model; and (4) the deterrence model. See Lee, supra note 105, at
156-75. Professor Chen identifies the same four. See Chen, supra note 57, at 603-08.
Although the names of these theories differ, they are the same theories as those described
in the text. What McCord calls the “de novo litigation model” and Lee and Chen call the “federal forum model” is otherwise known as the “full federal forum” approach. What McCord,
Lee, and Chen call “the process model” or the “one-fair-chance vision” is the same as Professor
Bator’s “full and fair opportunity” theory. McCord’s “inverse correlation vision” is also known
as the “deterrence model,” as Chen and Lee call it. Lee’s and Chen’s “innocence model” corresponds to Judge Friendly’s “colorable innocence” model, and McCord’s “innocence-selective
vision” corresponds to the “guilt and innocence approach” to selecting claims. The only models
not accounted for in this Article are the “equitable remedy” vision (which sees the purpose of
habeas as doing “justice”), see McCord, supra note 5, at 780, and the “death-is-different” vision
(which views death-related claims on habeas as special), see id. at 783-84, but they act more as
supplemental rationales than as independent models.
151. Yackle, supra note 75, at 2425-26. Professor Yackle is the primary advocate of this
model.
152. Justice Brennan was an adherent of this view, as his majority opinion in Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), demonstrated. See id. at 8 (“Conventional notions of finality of
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights
is alleged.”).
153. Yackle, supra note 75, at 2333. In the last 10 years, the Court has expanded the “abuse
of the writ” and successive writ doctrines to make it more difficult for state prisoners to bring
multiple habeas petitions. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (adopting the
“cause” and “prejudice” standard to overcome “abuse of the writ” claims); see also J. Thomas
Sullivan, The “Burden” of Proof in Federal Habeas Litigation, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 205, 207
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This theory is ill suited to serve as a criterion for selecting which
constitutional claims should be cognizable on federal habeas. To begin with, the premise of this approach—that state prisoners should
have a right of access to federal courts for relitigation of their constitutional claims—is at odds with both the historical and modern conceptions of judicial federalism. The lower federal courts owe their
very existence to Congress, not to the Constitution.154 It is accordingly
difficult to establish that there is any sort of historical right to a federal forum. Even if one ignores history and focuses on the federal
court system as it exists today, it is clear that the federal courts rarely
serve as a forum for relitigating issues—even federal issues—previously adjudicated in state courts. Congress, through the Full Faith and
Credit Statute, has made clear its view that the final judgments of
state courts should normally not be revisited in federal court, even
when they resolve issues of federal law.155 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has established several abstention doctrines that require the
lower federal courts not to intervene in ongoing state proceedings
that may involve questions of federal law.156 On a more practical level,
(1995) (claiming that in the last decade “[t]he Court’s approach has essentially restricted state
prisoners to litigation of constitutional claims in a single federal habeas action, recognizing only
quite limited exceptions to this general policy” (footnote omitted)). Congress further restricted
the availability of subsequent habeas petitions with the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)
(1994).
154. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish”) (emphasis added); Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74 (creating the
lower federal courts); see also Bator, supra note 91, at 507 (“Surely it is plain that there exists no
constitutional right to have the merits of a federal question determined by a federal constitutional court . . . .”).
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994):
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory or Possession of
the United States] . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
156. Under the Court’s Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain federal claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of a judgment already rendered by a state court system, when the federal and state actions involve the
same parties. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Court’s Younger abstention doctrine keeps the federal courts from litigating federal questions at issue in ongoing state
litigation, at least when the proceedings “implicate important state interests” and there is “an
adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise [federal questions].” Middlesex County
Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971)); see also Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and
the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2471 (1993) (rejecting the “full federal forum” theory because “the general fabric of federal jurisdiction as currently patterned does not offer the
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however, this theory is unhelpful because it envisions relitigation of
all federal constitutional claims. It therefore provides no useful basis
for deciding which constitutional claims should not be relitigated.
2. The Deterrence Model. This model sees federal habeas review primarily as a mechanism for ensuring that state actors—e.g.,
law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges—properly follow
157
the dictates of federal constitutional law. In this view, habeas hangs
like the sword of Damocles over the heads of these state actors, deterring them from violating the federal constitutional rights of persons who eventually become state prisoners. The Court relied on this
rationale in Teague when it held that state prisoners could not avail
themselves of favorable changes in federal constitutional law handed
down after their state appeals ended, in part because state judges
could not realistically be expected to apply (or be deterred from misapplying) federal law that had not yet been decided.158
The deterrence theory suffers from two major drawbacks, however: it has been criticized both as implying the incompetence of state
actors and as being wholly ineffectual, since state actors are unlikely
to change their behavior in light of the very small number of habeas
petitions that are actually granted.159 Regardless of the merits of these
criticisms, however, the deterrence model would surely mandate relitigation of almost every constitutional claim, since nearly every constitutional criminal procedure right serves to deter some state actor—
whether it be the police officer who unlawfully searches a suspect, the
prosecutor who inflames the jury, or the judge who misapplies Su-

opportunity to litigate every federal claim in a federal trial forum”).
157. See Lee, supra note 105, at 197 (“[T]he proper question [in habeas] is whether the grant
of relief in this type of case is likely to have some deterrent value against future constitutional
violations.”); McCord, supra note 5, at 778-79 (outlining the contours of what he refers to as the
“inverse correlation vision” of habeas, which tracks the deterrence theory); Peller, supra note 5,
at 668 (noting how federal habeas serves as a deterrent to state courts’ misconstruing federal
constitutional law). Even Justice Harlan has acknowledged this role of habeas. See Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “the threat of collateral attack may be necessary to assure that the lower federal and state courts toe the constitutional line”).
158. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989) (plurality).
159. See supra note 131. While deterrence may be inappropriate as the touchstone for federal habeas, one must recognize that the existence of habeas review itself serves some deterrent
purpose by providing additional review of state court actions. The point here is simply that a
writ premised solely on the deterrence rationale is of questionable utility, not that deterrence
should be abandoned entirely as a supplemental rationale.
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preme Court precedent.160 As a result, the deterrence theory is, like
the full federal forum model, singularly unhelpful as a tool for distinguishing among constitutional claims.
3. The Guilt and Innocence Model. Under this view, federal
habeas functions primarily as a backstop “to assure that no innocent
person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty.”161 As this Article
illustrates, innocence can potentially be used in several ways to
narrow the substantive scope of the writ. Earlier in Part II, it was
proposed that innocence be used as a tool to screen out individual
habeas petitions—state prisoners able to make a “colorable showing
of innocence” would be permitted to raise any constitutional claim,
regardless of whether that claim was related to the evidence of their
innocence.162 Here, by contrast, innocence is to be used as a tool to
determine which constitutional claims may be raised by any habeas
petitioner, even one who cannot make a “colorable showing of
innocence.” That is, the guilt and innocence model scrutinizes
individual constitutional claims to determine whether they help
secure the accuracy of the guilty verdict (or instead serve other values
unrelated to guilt or innocence), and only those constitutional claims
relevant to guilt or innocence are to be cognizable on habeas.
The Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with Stone v.
Powell,163 started to explore a narrowing of the substantive scope of
habeas using a variant of this model. In Stone, the Supreme Court
held that habeas petitioners normally would no longer be permitted
to assert claims based on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
if the state courts provided “an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of a Fourth Amendment claim.”164 The Court reached this conclusion
after “weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of

160. See Chen, supra note 57, at 608-09 (noting that “two distinct elements to the deterrence
argument” are “deter[ring] state judges from ignoring federal constitutional law in their decisionmaking” and “deter[ring] state and local law enforcement officials from constitutional transgressions”); Woolhandler, supra note 105, at 641 (claiming that persons “seeking habeas are
generally seeking remedies for unredressed ad hoc denials of constitutional rights, inflicted by
police, prosecutors, or the state courts”).
161. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
162. See supra Part II.A.2.
163. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
164. Id. at 494. The Court said that, “where the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” the Constitution does not require that a state
prisoner “be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id.
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extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims”165 and
finding that the “additional contribution, if any, of the consideration
of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review [is]
small in relation to the costs.”166 In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed a somewhat narrower vision of habeas,
noting that “[r]esort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other
than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss
of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of government.”167 Unsurprisingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall
in dissent regarded the majority’s opinion as “portend[ing] substantial
evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.”168
As it turns out, however, their prediction was wrong, and the
Court turned away several subsequent attempts to extend Stone to
other claims. In Rose v. Mitchell,169 the Court concluded that “discrimination in the selection of the grand jury differs so fundamentally
from application on habeas of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule that the reasoning of Stone v. Powell should not be extended to
foreclose habeas review of such claims in federal court.”170 In Jackson

165. Id. at 489.
166. Id. at 493; accord id. (“There is no reason to believe . . . that the overall educative effect
of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not
be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.”). The Court was careful to point
out, however, that this new limitation on habeas was equitable, not jurisdictional. See id. at 495
n.37 (“Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim,
but only that the application of the rule is limited to cases in which there has been both such a
showing [i.e., of no opportunity for litigating the Fourth Amendment claim in state court] and a
Fourth Amendment violation.”).
167. Id. at 491 n.31.
168. Id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 284
(“For a number of reasons . . . Stone cannot be read simply as a Fourth Amendment case.”);
Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 919 (“Powell is better read as a limitation on habeas
than as a gloss on the exclusionary rule.”).
169. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
170. Id. at 560-61. The majority reasoned that the equal protection claim in Rose involved a
“personal constitutional right,” while the exclusionary rule at issue in Stone was merely “a judicially created remedy.” Id. at 562. It also observed that “the concern with judicial integrity is of
much greater concern in grand jury discrimination cases.” Id. at 563. This concern played a
“limited role” in Stone. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). Finally, the majority fell back
on the naked proposition that “the constitutional interests that a federal court adjudicating a
claim on habeas of grand jury discrimination seeks to vindicate are substantially more compelling than those at issue in Stone.” Rose, 443 U.S. at 564. The Court gave no weight to the fact
that grand jury discrimination has little to do with the accuracy of the guilty verdict at trial. See
id. at 560 (noting that Stone said it was limited to the exclusionary rule context). In addition, the
Court cited the fact that the trial court itself could not police its own violations, that federal
courts have granted relief for such discrimination for over one hundred years, and that the costs
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171
v. Virginia, decided the same Term as Rose, the Court held that the
newly announced due process right to sufficiency of the evidence review could be raised on federal habeas notwithstanding Stone, mostly
notable because “[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of
guilt or innocence,” which Stone had held was the touchstone purpose
of habeas.172 In Kimmelman v. Morrison,173 the Court found that Sixth
Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to
Fourth Amendment claims were cognizable.174
In the 1993 case of Withrow v. Williams,175 the Court wrote what
may be the last chapter in the story of Stone. By a 5-4 margin, the
Withrow Court held that, with respect to claims arising under
176
Miranda v. Arizona, Stone should not be extended. Justice Souter’s
majority opinion distinguished Stone on three grounds. First, he noted
that Miranda, while “prophylactic,” nevertheless “safeguard[ed] ‘a
fundamental trial right’”—namely, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination.177 By contrast, the exclusionary rule protected against violations of the Fourth Amendment, which are usually
committed by law enforcement officers and are therefore “wholly ex-

of granting habeas relief were less than in the Stone context because, on retrial, probative evidence would not have to be excluded. See id. at 561-64.
171. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
172. Id. at 323; accord infra note 184 (quoting Stone on the purpose of habeas). In recognizing this new claim on habeas, the Court also observed that such claims would not “create an
entirely new class of cases cognizable on federal habeas corpus,” because they resembled other
claims already cognizable, and noted that the general costs of habeas in terms of “finality and
federal-state comity” were not reasons in themselves not to recognize a constitutional claim on
habeas. Id. at 321-22.
173. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
174. See id. at 365. In reaching its holding, the Court noted that Stone involved a “judicially
created structural remedy” and not a “personal constitutional right.” Id. at 375-76. While the
Court did not assess whether the right to counsel (and the concomitant right to effective assistance) helped guarantee the accuracy of the guilty verdict, the majority nevertheless repeatedly
stressed that the right to counsel was essential to the “fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our
adversary process.” Id. at 374; see also id. at 377 (recognizing how the right to counsel assures “a
fair trial itself”). The Court also held that recognizing the right to counsel on habeas was important because “collateral review will frequently be the only means through which an accused can
effectuate the right to counsel.” Id. at 378. Of course, ineffective assistance claims that could not
be raised in state court would be cognizable even under Stone’s rule, because petitioners asserting such claims would not have had a “full and fair opportunity” to present them in state
proceedings. The Kimmelman majority did not acknowledge or account for the fact that Stone
already preserved review in these circumstances.
175. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
176. See id. at 691.
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
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trajudicial.”178 Second, Justice Souter observed that the Fifth
Amendment often enhances the accuracy of the guilty verdict, which
is undermined when a coerced confession is introduced.179 Finally, Justice Souter noted that withdrawal of habeas review for Miranda
claims would be unlikely to “benefit the federal courts” because those
claims would probably be recast as violations of the due process protection against coerced confessions.180
As the above discussion indicates, the Supreme Court in these
cases did not use a constitutional claim’s relation to the accuracy of a
defendant’s guilty verdict as the sole basis for deciding whether a particular constitutional claim would be cognizable on habeas. In Stone
itself, the Court made clear that even Fourth Amendment claims
normally excluded from review on habeas could be raised if a particular defendant did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate
the claim in state court.181 In this regard, Stone reflects a blending of

178. Id.
179. See id. at 692.
180. Id. at 693. Justice O’Connor was not convinced, and she dissented with Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Souter that the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination protection was a “fundamental trial right” that, when violated, could undermine
the accuracy of the guilty verdict. Id. at 705 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). However, she found that
fact entirely beside the point, since the issue was not whether to exclude from habeas review
claims arising under the Fifth Amendment, but whether to exclude confessions obtained in violation of Miranda’s prophylactic rule, which excludes from trial any confessions—voluntary or
involuntary—obtained without the benefit of Miranda’s now-familiar warnings. See id.
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s spirited defense of the Fifth Amendment is, of course,
entirely beside the point.”). Indeed, because Fifth Amendment claims would remain available
to state prisoners on habeas, continued review of Miranda claims on habeas would in effect secure relief “only in those cases in which the prisoner’s statement was neither compelled nor involuntary.” Id. at 706 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). As a result, Justice O’Connor reasoned, excluding claims based on failure to give Miranda warnings from federal collateral review would
not undermine the accuracy of the guilty verdict or rob petitioners of the right to assert any fundamental trial rights. See id. at 706-07 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She also found unpersuasive
Justice Souter’s argument that excluding Miranda claims would be ineffectual because those
claims would be rewritten as due process claims. See id. at 708-09 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Due process claims, she explained, “require coercive state action,” which she argued was much
more difficult to establish than the simple failure to give Miranda warnings. Id. (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Scalia dissented separately, with Justice Thomas, chastising the majority and Justice O’Connor for overlooking what he considered to be the most salient point—that “Williams
has already had full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim [in state court].” Id. at 715 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to explain why Professor Bator’s “full and fair” opportunity approach, with exceptions for claims “go[ing] to the fairness of the trial process or to the
accuracy of the ultimate result,” should be the appropriate guide. Id. at 718-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976) (framing the question presented as
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the guilt and innocence model and the “full and fair” opportunity approach to habeas.182
Stone and its progeny were also not uniform in treating guilt as
183
their guiding light. To be sure, the Court in Stone specifically explained why the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule did not relate
to the defendant’s guilt and often obfuscated the search for truth.184
Similarly, in Jackson, the Court explained why a constitutional claim
relating to the sufficiency of evidence was appropriately litigated on
habeas because it was intimately related to the question of the defendant’s guilt.185 However, in Kimmelman, Rose, and Withrow, the
Court seemingly gave little weight to the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
discriminatory selection of the grand jury, and Miranda’s prophylactic
exclusionary rule often have no bearing on the defendant’s guilt.186
In addition, the Court in these opinions often referred to other
considerations aside from a claim’s relationship to the question of
guilt when deciding whether a claim could be relitigated on federal
habeas. In nearly every post-Stone opinion, the Court purported to

“whether state prisoners—who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair consideration . . . by the state courts at trial and on direct review—may invoke their claim again on federal
habeas corpus review” (emphasis added)).
182. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at 1077-78 (criticizing
Stone for relying on both theories); Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 277-79 (observing
how Stone relied on both Professor Bator’s “corrective process” theory and Judge Friendly’s
“guilt-related” theory); Peller, supra note 5, at 602 (criticizing Stone for relying on both theories,
which are “fundamentally divergent”).
183. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 280-86 (noting inconsistencies between
Stone and Jackson on the one hand, and Rose and Kimmelman on the other).
184. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90 (“The costs of applying the exclusionary rule . . . are well
known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.”).
185. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (“The question whether a defendant
has been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence.”).
186. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986):
[W]e have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence. The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent
and the guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to
matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.
See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979) (distinguishing Stone’s concern with accuracy of the guilty verdict by seemingly confining Stone to its facts); cf. Withrow v. Williams, 507
U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (reasoning that Miranda ensures reliability of confessions, at least when the
confessions are obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
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distinguish Stone on the ground that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was a judicially created remedy instead of a “personal
constitutional right.”187 This distinction has little to do with accuracy
of the guilty verdict, and it is particularly disingenuous as a basis for
contrasting Miranda, as Miranda itself announced a judicially created
exclusionary rule.188 Indeed, the case for not applying Miranda’s exclusionary rule on habeas may be more compelling than the argument
for excluding the Fourth Amendment’s, since Miranda’s rule may apply in situations where there is not an underlying constitutional violation.189 The Court has also treated a constitutional claim’s relationship
to judicial integrity inconsistently. In Stone, the Court downplayed
the importance of judicial integrity, while in Rose the Court found it
to be “of much greater concern.”190 The Court’s inconsistent use of
these and other factors undercuts the rationality of the Court’s approach to picking and choosing among constitutional claims.191

187. Rose, 443 U.S. at 561-62 (distinguishing the exclusionary rule in Stone on the ground
that it was a “judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right” (citation and
internal quotations omitted)); see also Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691 (contrasting Miranda with the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because the former “safeguards a fundamental trial
right,” while the latter involves a “wholly extrajudicial Fourth Amendment violation” (internal
citation and quotation omitted)); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 377 (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a “personal” and “fundamental right” relevant to “trial”).
188. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (“Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible.”).
189. Even Professor Peller, an advocate for broad habeas review, acknowledges the illogic
of the Court’s precedent on this point. See Peller, supra note 5, at 600 (“Moreover, the Court’s
suggestion that the distinction between Rose and Stone turns on the difference between personal and judicially created remedies is inexplicable since the Court also stated that the accused’s right to reversal on direct review was a right accorded for auxiliary social purposes.”).
190. Rose, 433 U.S. at 563. But cf. Stone, 428 U.S. at 485 (downplaying the value put on judicial integrity).
191. Other factors the Court has cited on occasion include: (i) whether application of the
constitutional right at issue on habeas is likely to deter future violations, compare Stone, 428
U.S. at 486, 492 (reasoning that police are less likely to be deterred because the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is applied on habeas), with Rose, 443 U.S. at 563 (concluding that
habeas review of grand jury discrimination claims will deter such discrimination); (ii) whether
recognizing the constitutional claim on habeas will drain judicial resources, compare Withrow,
507 U.S. at 693 (reasoning that exclusion of Miranda claims on habeas will not reduce the judicial burden because those claims will be recast as due process violations) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979) (recognizing that sufficiency of the evidence claims have long
been heard on federal habeas and rarely require hearings), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31
(identifying the drain on judicial resources from rehearing claims unrelated to guilt); and (iii)
whether the constitutional claim has been around for several years, see Rose, 443 U.S. at 562
(emphasizing that grand jury discrimination claims have been litigated in federal court for over
one hundred years).
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Even a more “pure” version of the guilt and innocence model
would still not provide a workable basis for distinguishing among constitutional claims. First, and perhaps most fatally, this approach presupposes that constitutional claims can be distinguished on the basis
of whether they serve to enhance the accuracy of the underlying
guilty verdict. But, as many commentators have noted, constitutional
rights usually serve several purposes, depending upon the situation in
which they are applied.192 Miranda, for example, enhances the reliability of custodial confessions, but when a confession is coerced,
Miranda also protects the accuracy of the guilty verdict. As this example illustrates, because many constitutional rights at one time or
another are relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, this approach is also unlikely to screen out an appreciable number of consti193
tutional claims. Finally, as mentioned above, several constitutional
guarantees are geared toward ensuring procedural regularity regardless of the outcome.194 Using the determination of guilt and innocence
as the sole basis for sifting through constitutional claims would likely
exclude from habeas review procedurally focused rights, notwithstanding the Court’s repeated statements that they are often among
the most basic of the constitutional rights.195 There is accordingly a
good argument that a writ defined in this manner may go too far. For
all these reasons, the guilt and innocence approach does not provide
the best foundation for a leaner writ of habeas corpus.
4. The Appellate Model. Grounded in legal pragmatism, the appellate model of habeas pays close attention to how the federal habeas writ actually functions in the courts today. Proponents of this
model, including Professors Barry Friedman and James Liebman, begin by noting that habeas looks far more like an appeal than the

192. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at 1093 (noting that “most constitutional
rights do not fit neatly into the category of truth-furthering or truth-obstructing [rights]”); Peller, supra note 5, at 664 (stressing that “constitutional rights vindicate diverse values”).
193. See Lee, supra note 105, at 196 (claiming that “constitutionally-mandated procedures
that are not aimed at safeguarding against mistakes in the determination of guilt are exceptional
and, for the most part, notable”); Yeager, supra note 50, at 696 n.172 (“[A]ny categorical rule
that would exempt from preclusion or forfeit claims only tenuously related to accuracy would be
far too capacious to trim habeas in the name of accuracy; it would trim nothing.”).
194. See supra notes 114, 186. That is not to say, however, that guilt and innocence should be
irrelevant. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 50, at 88 (maintaining that “constructing the law
of habeas without a reference to innocence and guilt means ignoring the central point of the
criminal justice system”); see also infra Part III.A.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67 (citing to “structural error” cases).
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original civil action it technically is.196 Unlike most civil actions, habeas is not subject to the general rule of res judicata that would otherwise preclude a collateral attack on a state judgment of conviction.197 Also unlike other original actions, habeas proceedings are
intimately related to prior state adjudications—to what factual and
legal findings the state courts made and to whether the habeas petitioner properly raised a claim, to name a pair of examples.198 Indeed,
this close tie often precludes the habeas litigant—unlike most civil
litigants—from developing a new factual record at a hearing in federal court.199
By contrast, many aspects of federal habeas review make it look
like a final layer in a single process of appellate review that begins in
state court after a conviction is handed down and ends with federal
habeas.200 First, the relevant substantive law for habeas purposes—
that is, federal constitutional law—is the same both in the state courts
and on federal habeas review due to incorporation.201 Second, the
196. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 261 (“Habeas must be seen . . . as an appeal to a federal forum available in every state criminal case.”); id. at 254 (noting that habeas
review in the district courts acts as a “surrogate for the United States Supreme Court . . . executing appellate jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings”); Liebman, supra note 109, at 2055
(“Since 1789, however, the federal writ of habeas corpus has provided statutorily specified
classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute federal writ of error or appeal as of right.”);
McCord, supra note 5, at 838 (“There were then, and still are, many significant areas of habeas
jurisprudence that can be explained by the appellate review vison.”).
197. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (providing that state court decisions “shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from
which they are taken”), with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (recognizing that state
court decisions are not res judicata in federal habeas review).
198. See Liebman, supra note 109, at 2088 (arguing that habeas actions “are affected by
prior judicial proceedings far too frequently to qualify as truly separate or ‘original’ actions”).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. III 1997) (permitting habeas petitioners to have a
hearing to develop the factual basis for their claims only under certain circumstances); Williams
v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) (holding that § 2254(e)(2)’s tighter standards governing when
an evidentiary hearing is appropriate apply only if a habeas petitioner was not diligent or was
otherwise somehow at fault in developing the factual basis for his claim in state court); Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (holding that a habeas petitioner’s failure to develop the
factual basis for a claim in state court would be overcome only if the petitioner established
“cause” and “prejudice” or that the failure to hold a hearing would be a “fundamental miscarriage of justice”).
200. See Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 523 (1996) (“[I]t is important to view the entire criminal justice system—state and federal—as a system, and not a series of independent institutions.”).
201. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 50, at 79 (claiming that “federal law today serves as
a floor and a ceiling and everything in between: federal law dictates, often in minute detail, the
course of state criminal proceedings”); see also supra note 138 (detailing the Constitution’s
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procedural mechanisms that govern appellate practice have nearly
identical analogues to the procedural doctrines that control habeas
review. State appellants are usually required to preserve errors at trial
or in earlier appeals before raising them at the next stage of the state
appellate review process.202 Similarly, habeas petitioners are required
by the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines to demonstrate
that they raised their constitutional claims in the state courts before
raising them again on habeas.203 State appellants are permitted only
one appeal; habeas petitioners are, for most intents and purposes,
also permitted to file only one federal petition.204 Finally, the stan-

transformation into a national code of criminal procedure).
202. Most states require timely preservation of error. For example, defendants must usually
object to jury instructions before the jury retires to consider the verdict. See, e.g., ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 21.3(c); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 30; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390(d); ILL. R. CRIM. P. 451(b).
They must also make timely objections to the introduction of evidence, see, e.g., COLO. R. EVID.
103(a)(1), and timely requests for a new trial, see, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35.
203. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991):
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Usually, a habeas petitioner who fails to exhaust his state claims before proceeding in
federal court will not be able to satisfy state procedural rules when he returns to state court to
exhaust his claims. See id. at 735 n.* (finding that a default had occurred when “the petitioner
failed to exhaust state remedies and the [state] court to which petitioner would be required to
present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”); see also Liebman, supra note 109, at 2094-95 (“Via the exhaustion doctrine,
the Court recently has assured that habeas corpus petitioners, like direct appellants, cannot seek
the reviewing court’s consideration before seeking the prior court’s judgment.”); supra Part I.
204. Constitutional claims raised in subsequent habeas petitions usually fall into one of two
categories. In the first category are the claims that were asserted and litigated in a prior habeas petition. These claims are called “successive claims” and are barred in subsequent petitions
unless “the prisoner supplements his [successive] constitutional claim with a colorable showing
of factual innocence.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). But see Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (characterizing Kuhlmann as also permitting a prisoner to show
“cause” and “prejudice” in addition to innocence). The second category consists of those claims
that could have been raised (but were not) in previously filed habeas petitions. These claims are
referred to as “abusive claims” and are barred unless the petitioner satisfies the same “cause”
and “prejudice” standard used to overcome procedural defaults. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 493 (1991).
In 1996, Congress altered both the procedural and substantive prerequisites to be met before a “second or successive” petition could be filed in the federal courts. Successive petitions
now appear to be barred under all circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (Supp. III 1997)
(“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under § 2254 that was
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”). Abusive petitions, in contrast, are barred
unless the late-asserted claim relies on a new rule of law made retroactive by the Supreme Court
or rests on new facts that could not have been previously discovered and that would likely exon-
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dards of review used by state courts in reviewing the findings of lower
tribunals were, until recently, identical to the standards of review
used by habeas courts in reviewing the findings of state courts: findings of fact were given deference, while legal findings or findings involving mixed questions or law and fact were reviewed de novo.205
In fact, the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged that habeas review in some respects serves as a substitute for direct review
that the Court itself cannot conduct given its limited resources.206
Congress buttressed this view when it amended the statutory writ to
make Supreme Court adjudication of an issue on direct review conclusive in subsequent habeas review, which seemingly indicates Congress’s view that habeas review is necessary only when the Supreme
Court has not reviewed an issue.207 To be sure, the Court has repeatedly admonished that “habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute
for appeal.”208 In fact, federal habeas review that takes place at the
conclusion of the state appellate process is not a substitute for an appeal: it is arguably an extension of the appellate process.
erate the habeas petitioner of his underlying guilt. See id. § 2244(b)(2). Procedurally, a habeas
petitioner must now ask the court of appeals for permission to file any “second or successive”
petition in district court, which can only be granted by the court of appeals if the statute’s requirements are met. See id. § 2244(b)(3) (setting forth this “gatekeeper” mechanism).
205. See supra note 55.
206. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456-57 (1953) (holding that a denial of certiorari on
direct review does not have conclusive weight on habeas, because giving denials such weight
would essentially shut down habeas review, given the Court’s inability to review the merits of
many cases on direct review); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 755 (“If there was to be
federal court review of state court procedures, it would have to be undertaken primarily in the
district courts through habeas corpus [instead of by the Supreme Court through direct review].”); Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 274 (“At the heart of the Brown Court’s decision to expand the scope of federal habeas, therefore, was its realization that direct review alone
no longer could provide adequate treatment of federal questions arising in state criminal
cases.”).
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c):
In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the Supreme Court of the
United States on an appeal or review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the
prisoner of the decision of such State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of
fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes
ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the
Supreme Court therein . . . .
208. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 333 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963) (“The whole history of the writ—its unique development—refutes a construction of the federal courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate
their task to that of courts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different.”); Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947) (“So far as convictions obtained in the federal courts are concerned, the general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an
appeal.”).
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Federal habeas review is not identical to an appeal, however.
Unlike an appellate court, a habeas court is not confined to the facts
developed in the record below, and it may hold a hearing to receive
209
new facts when necessary to evaluate the merits of certain claims.
Congress’s recent alteration of the standards by which federal habeas
courts now evaluate the findings of state courts on issues involving legal questions may also distinguish habeas from a direct appeal. A petition may now be granted only if the state adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.”210 The Supreme Court recently held that
this language requires a federal habeas court to defer to a state
court’s reasonable interpretations of federal law, even if the habeas
court would have reached a different conclusion “in its independent
judgment.”211
In the same vein, the Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson212 changed
the standard governing when federal habeas courts can grant relief.213
No longer can federal courts use the same harmless error test used by
courts on direct appeal.214 Under Brecht, once a constitutional violation has been established, habeas courts can grant relief only if it is
shown that the error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”215
In addition, the rules that require errors to be preserved on appeal are in some ways distinguishable from the procedural default
doctrine applicable on habeas. The former usually brook no exceptions, while the procedural default doctrine will excuse the failure to
preserve for petitioners able to demonstrate “cause” and “prejudice,”
or their probable innocence.216 All of these differences reflect that,
while largely similar to an appeal, federal habeas review nevertheless
serves other values.
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1994) (“On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may
be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit.”); see also id. §
2254(e) (setting forth standards for when a factual hearing is warranted).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
211. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1522 (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes
57-60.
212. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
213. See McCord, supra note 5, at 834 (calling Brecht a “disaffirmation of the appellate review vision”).
214. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
215. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
216. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
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Most proponents of the appellate model argue that, if habeas
functions as an appeal in the real world, that analogy should be extended to confer upon the federal habeas courts the same breadth in
the claims they review as that exercised by the state appellate
courts.217 Because the state appellate courts review all federal constitutional claims, these proponents reason, federal habeas courts should
do the same. This syllogism regarding the scope of federal habeas under the appellate model, while tidy, overlooks two salient
points. First, the scope of habeas review is already different from the
scope of state appellate review. Congress, perhaps recognizing the
danger of federal court review of purely state law issues, precluded
federal habeas courts from reviewing statutory and constitutional issues based on state law, even though they may be raised on direct appeal in state court.218 Second, as discussed above, while the analogy
between federal habeas and direct appeal is a strong one, it is not perfect.219 Because the appellate model is premised in large part upon the
strength of the descriptive analogy between habeas review and appellate review, weaknesses in the analogy make automatic importation of appellate procedures—including the scope of review—into the
habeas context inappropriate. With this type of hybrid descriptive/normative model, due consideration must be given to the actual
differences between state appellate review and habeas—namely, that
habeas review is conducted by courts of a different sovereign and that
habeas review serves a more limited function than error correction.
Consequently, the “pure” appellate model is unhelpful in the
search for criteria by which to evaluate constitutional claims because
it would permit review of all such claims and because it fails to recognize that habeas is both more and less than a typical state appeal. The
appellate model nevertheless closely represents how the federal writ
currently functions today.
217. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 286-87 (“Because any federal claim preserved in state court proceedings may be raised on direct review, any such claim should also be
subject to federal habeas review.”); cf. Liebman, supra note 109, at 2056 (“As a substitute for
federal direct appeal, habeas corpus has never duplicated, but has always mirrored the scope of,
Supreme Court review on direct appeal.”).
218. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’” (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 780 (1990)); cf. Liebman, supra note 109, at 2009 (“Habeas petitioners have access to a limited form of appellate review. The review is ‘limited’ because only issues arising under the national constitution, laws, and treaties are cognizable.”).
219. See Liebman, supra note 109, at 2005 (“[T]he two modes of review are not identical . . . . [but have] rather modest differences.”).
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5. The “Fundamental Fairness” Model. This model views federal
habeas as a means of ensuring that state prisoners are afforded some
minimum quantum of fairness, without which their continued
incarceration would be “fundamentally unfair.” Over the years, the
Supreme Court has called upon this theory to justify both the
expansion—and the contraction—of the federal writ. In fact, three
different versions of this theory seem to have emerged.
In the 1960s, the Court latched onto a very expansive variant of
this theory that allowed state prisoners to revisit nearly any federal
constitutional claim, regardless of what had happened in earlier state
220
221
proceedings. In Fay v. Noia, for example, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion started from the premise that “if [a prisoner’s] imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.”222
The Court in Fay went on to rely in part upon this rationale in requiring federal habeas courts to ignore most procedural defaults.223 In
the same vein, in Townsend v. Sain,224 Chief Justice Warren held that
the writ’s function “as an efficacious and imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality” dictated that the Court confer
upon habeas courts a near-plenary power to hold evidentiary hearings.225
In the 1980s and 1990s, a majority of the Court began to espouse
a far more limited version of this theory, primarily by stressing the
“fundamental” aspect of the formulation. In Engle v. Isaac,226 Justice
O’Connor wrote for the majority that “the writ is a bulwark against
convictions that violate ‘fundamental fairness,’”227 and then held—in

220. This expansive view of “fundamental fairness” was not confined to the 1960s and 1970s.
For example, in the 1990s, Justice Blackmun argued that a “‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’
occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in violation of a federal constitutional
right.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 352 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
221. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
222. Id. at 402.
223. See id. at 438 (recognizing a “limited discretion” for federal judges to overlook procedural defaults in state courts if a petitioner “has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of
the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies”).
224. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
225. Id. at 311; see also id. at 312 (“State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas
corpus only upon proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person,
safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution.”).
226. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
227. Id. at 126 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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contradiction to Fay—that procedural defaults in state courts would
not be examined during federal habeas review unless a petitioner
demonstrated “cause” and “prejudice” or her probable innocence.228
In two 1986 companion cases, the Court elaborated on the exception to procedural default for “fundamental miscarriages of justice”
and held that the exception applied only where the state prisoner
could show that she was probably “actually innocent.”229 The Court
explicitly “reject[ed] the suggestion that there is anything ‘fundamentally unfair’ about enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid
of any substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination.”230 The Court similarly
adhered to the accuracy-based notion of “fundamental fairness” in
231
Teague v. Lane, when it held that only watershed rules of criminal
procedure “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished” could be applied retroactively to habeas petitioners.232 Mirroring its holdings in the habeas context, the
Court in Medina v. California233 held that state procedures in criminal
cases would be struck down under the Due Process Clause only for
“fundamental unfairness”234 and confirmed that, “[i]n the field of
criminal law, we have ‘defined the category of infractions that violate
“fundamental fairness” very narrowly.’”235
Justice Stevens has steadily developed a third view of “fundamental fairness.” Taking a slightly different tack from the Courts of
the 1960s and the 1980s, Justice Stevens has acknowledged that some
constitutional rights are more fundamental than others—that is, that
the violation of some rights is “important enough to require reversal
228. See id. at 129.
229. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986); accord Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986) (companion case).
230. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538-39.
231. 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality).
232. Id. at 313. This accuracy-based notion of “fundamental fairness” is not unlike the
“guilt/innocence” approach to sifting through constitutional claims first espoused in Stone. See
supra Part II.B.3.
233. 505 U.S. 448 (1992).
234. Id. at 448. This was a departure from the standard used to evaluate state procedures in
civil cases announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under Mathews, the Court
employs a more liberal balancing test that examines: (i) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (ii) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used;” and (iii) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Id. at 335.
235. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)).
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on direct appeal but do[es] not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness to the accused that will support a collateral attack on a final
judgment,” while other rights are “so fundamental that [their violation] infect[s] the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which that judgment was obtained.”236 Given
this hierarchy, Justice Stevens has argued that habeas should be limited to constitutional claims implicating fundamental fairness—such a
standard, in Justice Stevens’s view, would be preferable to current jurisprudence, which theoretically allows for the possibility of reviewing
all claims while actually determining if habeas is available based on
“the procedural history underlying” a constitutional claim.237 By acknowledging that habeas might not be open as an avenue of relief for
all federal constitutional violations, Justice Stevens’s view of “fundamental fairness” is narrower than the Warren Court’s.238 At the same
time, Justice Stevens has opined that “[o]ur criminal justice system,
and our Constitution, protect other values in addition to the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination,” so that “the [Rehnquist]
Court’s exaltation of accuracy as the only characteristic of ‘fundamental fairness’ is deeply flawed.”239 As a result, Justice Stevens views

236. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 640 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting how “collateral relief
[has been confined] to cases that involve fundamental defects or omissions inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure”); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1503 (2000)
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (noting how “errors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly justify issuance of the federal writ”).
In that same vein, Justice Stevens wrote separately in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982),
to criticize the majority for dismissing a habeas petition under the procedural default doctrine.
See id. at 136-37 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens stated that “[a]
petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed if it . . . do[es] not describe a violation of
any constitutional right.” Id. at 136. Finding no alleged violation of a constitutional right in the
respondents’ claims regarding the burden of proof for self-defense, Stevens argued that the
Court should “simply [have held] that neither of the exhausted claims advanced by respondents
justifies a collateral attack on their convictions.” Id. at 137.
237. Rose, 455 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. (“The doctrine of nonretroactivity, the emerging ‘cause and prejudice’ doctrine, and today’s ‘total exhaustion’ rule are examples of judicial lawmaking that might well have been avoided by confining the availability of habeas corpus relief to cases that truly involve fundamental unfairness.”).
Justice Stevens was also willing to acknowledge that this line between fundamental and
nonfundamental rights was a useful one to draw for retroactivity purposes. “In ruling that a constitutional principle is not to be applied retroactively,” he reasoned in Rose, “the Court implicitly suggests that the right is not necessary to ensure the integrity of the underlying judgment.”
Id. at 544 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25 (referring to the Warren Court’s decisions
regarding “fundamental fairness”).
239. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“[f]undamental fairness [as] more than accuracy at trial” and “justice
[as] more than guilt or innocence.”240 In this respect, Justice Stevens’s
conception of fundamental fairness is broader than the Rehnquist
Court’s, which, in Justice Stevens’s words, would “exalt[] . . . accuracy
as the only [relevant] characteristic of ‘fundamental fairness.’”241
As this discussion illustrates, something of a consensus has developed among Supreme Court Justices coming from differing perspectives that the federal writ of habeas corpus guards against “fundamental unfairness.”242 Indeed, the debate over the substantive scope
of habeas may be largely understood as a debate over which constitutional claims are necessary to ensure “fundamental fairness.” Some
assert that a criminal trial cannot be fundamentally “fair” unless all
constitutional protections are in force,243 while others employ a more
stringent definition of “fundamental fairness.”244 Unfortunately, the
term itself is an amorphous and elastic concept, as the decades-long
debate over incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment vividly illustrates. What this discussion also illustrates,
however, is that the concept of “fundamental fairness” is quite malleable. Thus, before it can be used as a basis for distinguishing among
constitutional claims on habeas, it must be given a more definite content.

240. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 361 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
241. Smith, 477 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989) (plurality) (stressing that rules that are
“absolute prerequisite[s] to fundamental fairness” should be applied retroactively on habeas);
Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 488 (“Different Justices and decisions identify the
purposes of habeas corpus in varying terms . . . . [b]ut, at bottom, habeas clearly has something
to do with [fairness] matters such as vindicating constitutional rights.”).
243. Those who take the broader view of “fundamental fairness,” however, rarely couch
their arguments in those terms. Instead, they advocate different models to argue that all constitutional claims should be cognizable on habeas. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 75, at 2425-26 (advocating full review of all constitutional claims as part of his view that “[h]abeas is not a backstop against outrageous injustice, but a routine means by which federal claims, both
conventional and creative, can be considered in the ordinary course”). But these other models
are entirely consistent with the view that the availability of all federal constitutional rights is
necessary to assure “fundamental fairness.”
244. Advocates of this view generally posit that only a subset of constitutional guarantees
serve to secure “fundamental fairness.” See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 92, at 156 (“What I do
challenge is the assumption that simply because a claim can be characterized as ‘constitutional,’
it should necessarily constitute a basis for collateral attack when there has been a fair opportunity to litigate it at trial and on appeal.”); McCord, supra note 5, at 758 (describing “rights that
are fundamental to the fairness of the criminal proceeding” as a possible category of constitutional rights that could be preferred over others in habeas law).
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6. In Summary. Of the varying theories that might provide a
basis for selecting those constitutional claims that may be relitigated
on habeas, the fundamental fairness theory best describes the
traditional purpose of federal habeas, while the appellate theory best
describes the function of the writ today. Neither would suffice as a
selection criteria on its own, however. The fundamental fairness
theory, as discussed above, is too vague by itself to provide a basis for
distinguishing among various constitutional claims. Likewise, the
slight mismatch between appellate practice and habeas renders it
inappropriate to adopt blindly the appellate model and to conclude
that all federal constitutional claims should be available for
relitigation on habeas simply because they all may be litigated on
direct appeal. Combining these theories, however, could produce
criteria that reflect both the purpose and function of the writ and also
could provide a workable basis for picking and choosing among
constitutional claims. The next part sketches the contours of this new
theory and examines which constitutional claims would be available
for relitigation on federal habeas.
III. A COMBINED THEORY OF HABEAS
The most logical way to give content and boundaries to the theory of fundamental fairness is to view it through the prism of the appellate theory. In so doing, it is necessary to keep a critical point in
mind—that the primary object of this combined theory is to determine which claims may be relitigated after already being heard ( or,
presumably, waived) in the state courts. State prisoners who have not
had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate a federal constitutional
claim in the state courts would be permitted to raise such a claim on
habeas under the combined theory.245

245. See supra Part II.B.1. Making habeas available for the litigation of federal constitutional claims not fairly open for review in state court is a function of the combined model itself,
not simply a grafting of the “full and fair opportunity” model onto the combined model. If federal habeas is viewed in part as an extension of the state appellate process, habeas should be
available, at a minimum, to act as an appeal when the state courts fail to provide one. To do
otherwise would be to deny persons with such claims any opportunity to present their federal
constitutional claims, which would seem to be fundamentally unfair as well. This goes a long
way toward explaining why allowing habeas review in this context has broad-based support,
even including scholars such as Professor Bator and Judge Friendly, who would greatly curtail
the scope of habeas but who would still hold open the doors of the habeas courts when the
states fail to provide an opportunity to litigate constitutional claims. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
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A prisoner would not, however, be permitted to litigate a noncognizable claim again in federal court in what is, in effect, one more
appeal, and final resolution of that excluded claim would be entrusted
to the state courts. With that in mind, the question then becomes:
when would it be fundamentally unfair to foreclose a state prisoner
who has already had the opportunity to litigate a federal constitutional claim in the state courts from having what amounts to an additional appeal in federal court on that claim?246
The first situation that comes to mind is when the state prisoner
has reliable evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime of which
he was convicted or that he is “innocent of his sentence”—that is,
when he could not rationally have been sentenced to the punishment
he received if all the available evidence had been considered. In these
situations, it would seem fundamentally unfair to force him to remain
in prison without the opportunity to challenge his incarceration. It
would also seem fundamentally unfair to permit a state to incarcerate
a prisoner—regardless of her guilt—if the procedures by which she
was convicted did not satisfy what is considered essential to a fair trial
in this country. These very basic procedures include, among a few
other things, an unbiased judge, the opportunity for a jury trial, and
the provision of counsel.247 Both instances of fundamental unfairness
are discussed below.248
246. This question is, by its very definition, directed toward habeas petitions that attack the
underlying criminal conviction or sentence, both of which are appealable through the state
courts before reaching federal habeas. Although such claims account for the bulk of the petitions filed by state prisoners under § 2254, this section also reaches other claims of “wrongful”
custody, such as the denial of good-time credits or the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
prison, in which the remedy sought is “immediate or speedier release” or the remedy would
otherwise “necessarily . . . . demonstrate[] the invalidity of the . . . . ‘fact or length of confinement.’” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1994) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 490 (1973)). Because these claims do not involve the underlying judicial judgment of conviction or sentence, it is not clear that leaving state prisoners to their state remedies in this situation (unless those remedies are inadequate) would be fundamentally unfair. At a minimum,
these prison-based custody claims involve a different calculus than claims regarding the constitutional infirmity of custody pursuant to conviction. A more detailed analysis of these other
types of claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
247. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (securing the right against discriminatory tampering with the composition of the grand jury); Martin Linen Supply Co. v.
United States, 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977) (concluding that the Constitution protects against directed verdicts for the state in criminal cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(securing the right to counsel for indigents); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (securing
the right to an unbiased judge).
248. In discussing which claims would be cognizable on federal habeas, this Article contemplates that federal habeas courts would employ the same constitutional standards on habeas as
they do on direct review, except where otherwise noted. Although the Court’s recent opinion in
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A. Innocence-Based Claims
Given the centrality of a person’s innocence to the justice of her
incarceration, there is a strong argument that it would be fundamentally unfair to deny an innocent person an additional opportunity to
establish her innocence in federal court through the writ of habeas
corpus.249 The Supreme Court has recognized that “innocence” can refer both to innocence of the underlying criminal offense and to innocence of the sentence, at least where the sentence is death.250 Indeed,
the Court already permits habeas petitioners who can establish either
type of innocence the opportunity to proceed on habeas—an opportunity that other petitioners lack.251 As noted above, a state prisoner
who procedurally defaults on a federal constitutional claim may not
raise that claim on federal habeas without first establishing “cause,”
but a person who is probably innocent of the underlying crime may
proceed without demonstrating “cause.”252 State prisoners who are
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), held that Congress may not alter the content of
judicial interpretations of the Constitution, see id. at 524, Congress would not appear to run
afoul of this prohibition if it exercised its Article III power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts by granting federal jurisdiction over some, but not all, possible violations of a particular constitutional right. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.” (emphasis added)); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (declaring Congress’s control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
249. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986) (“[A] prisoner retains a powerful and
legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for which
he was incarcerated.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 792 (“At a minimum, society should
spend additional resources for those with a colorable claim of innocence.”); Hoffmann & Stuntz,
supra note 50, at 88 (arguing that “constructing the law of habeas without reference to innocence and guilt means ignoring the central point of the criminal justice system”).
250. The Court first recognized the “innocence of the death penalty” claim in Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). See id. at 537 (acknowledging “that the concept of ‘actual,’ as distinct from ‘legal,’ innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the
sentencing phase of a trial on a capital case,” but proceeding to examine the merits of an “innocence of death penalty” claim). The Court subsequently reaffirmed the validity of “innocence of
the death penalty” as a means of overcoming procedural bars for defaulted, successive, or abusive claims in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992), and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
314-15 (1995).
251. Indeed, one commentator has criticized the Court on this ground: “A showing of actual
innocence became the panacea for every ill that might be spoken of the many procedural hurdles erected by the Court’s habeas reform efforts.” Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at
508.
252. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (“[W]here a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”); supra text
accompanying notes 29-32.
The same rule applies to individuals who establish their “innocence of the death penalty,”
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able to make the requisite showing of innocence are also permitted in
subsequent habeas petitions to litigate claims that they have already
litigated, or could have litigated, in prior petitions.253 When Congress
amended the habeas statutes in 1996, however, it limited the ability of
innocent habeas petitioners to overcome these procedural barriers.254
There are two primary objections to revisiting innocence-based
constitutional claims on federal habeas. First, some have observed
that federal review of innocence-related claims is unnecessary because executive clemency already “provide[s] the ‘fail safe’ in our
criminal justice system.”255 Second, others have expressed hesitation
about allowing the federal courts to reexamine the guilt and sentencing determinations on habeas because those determinations are entrusted to the state courts.256 Such reexamination, the argument goes,
may also be impractical because the passage of time—years, and peralthough the required showing is much more demanding. See supra note 31. It is not enough to
show, as it is with innocence of the underlying crime, that no reasonable jury could have found
the defendant guilty. See supra note 31. Instead, the petitioner must show that “but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty
under the applicable state law,” and the petitioner must make this showing “by clear and convincing evidence.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added).
253. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 338-39 (holding that a prisoner may raise a constitutional claim
not previously raised in an earlier petition if he meets the “cause and prejudice” standard or is
able to demonstrate his innocence of the death penalty); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 49496 (1991) (recognizing the same exceptions for individuals able to establish their factual innocence); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (holding that a person may raise a constitutional claim in a “successive” habeas petition if he “supplements his constitutional claim with
a colorable showing of factual innocence”).
254. Congress appears to have limited the exceptions for innocence to situations where the
petitioner is not “guilty of the underlying offense,” thereby seemingly removing the exception
for innocence of the death penalty. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Specifically, this subsection permits
development of facts on habeas that were not developed in state courts only when “the facts
underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.” Id. (emphasis added); accord id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (permitting review of a
claim that was not previously raised in an earlier habeas petition because of new facts only if the
facts exonerate the petitioner “of the underlying offense”). In addition, Congress seems to have
eliminated entirely the ability to raise the same claim again in a subsequent habeas petition, no
matter what type of innocence the habeas petitioner might be able to establish. See id. §
2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under §
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”).
255. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
256. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 336 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the federal “sufficiency of the evidence” rule is inappropriate on habeas because “[t]he federal
district courts are . . . being directed simply to duplicate the reviewing function that is now being
performed adequately by state appellate courts”); Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at
544 (“The problem . . . is that the state court proceeding is supposedly where society determines
guilt.”).
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haps decades—between the conviction and sentence and habeas review diminishes the reliability of any federal redetermination.257
While not without force, neither of these objections is sufficiently
compelling to foreclose to persons who are actually innocent a resort
to the federal courts. It is important to understand that the efficacy of
executive clemency is questionable. There is no “right” to executive
clemency; it is solely a matter of “grace.” 258 The Constitution does not
require a state to create a clemency mechanism, and it only requires a
state to afford “minimal” due process protections at any such hearing.259 Not surprisingly, clemency is rarely granted. Since 1973, for example, more than 6100 persons have been sentenced to death in state
and federal courts, but only 146—or 2.4%—have had their sentences
commuted.260 Clemency may not, therefore, be a viable fail-safe for
erroneous determinations of guilt or sentence.261
Permitting federal courts to revisit the question of a state prisoner’s innocence is also no more onerous an intrusion into the province of state courts than federal review of other determinations regarding factual questions or mixed questions of constitutional import.
Indeed, the purpose of this Article is to minimize the intrusion imposed by federal habeas review itself by limiting the substantive scope
of the statutory writ. Where the state prisoner is actually innocent is

257. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403 (“Yet there is no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination [made by a habeas court] would be any more exact. To the contrary, the passage of
time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”).
258. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 1250 (1998) (plurality) (emphasizing that “the heart of executive clemency . . . is to grant clemency as a matter of grace”).
259. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 414 (“Of course, although the Constitution vests in the President a pardon power, it does not require the States to enact a clemency mechanism.”). The
Court addressed the level of procedural protections to be afforded in clemency proceedings in
Woodard. In that case, a four-Justice plurality, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, would attach no
constitutionally based procedural guarantees to clemency proceedings, largely because clemency is outside the system for adjudicating guilt or innocence and because “the executive’s
clemency authority would cease to be a matter of grace . . . if it were constrained by . . . [constitutionally mandated] procedural requirements.” Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1252 (plurality). A different four-Justice plurality, led by Justice O’Connor, would recognize that the Due Process
Clause provides “some minimal procedural safeguards” in clemency proceedings. Id. at 1254
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Judicial review would still be exceedingly narrow, however. As examples of when review might be appropriate, Justice O’Connor cited “a scheme whereby a state
official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or . . . a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.” Id.
260. See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997,
at 13 (1998).
261. See Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 506 (arguing that “the opportunity to
seek clemency is no substitute for proper judicial procedure”).
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one of the situations in which, under the narrower standard articulated by this Article, habeas review is most warranted. Consequently,
the burden of permitting relitigation of innocence-related claims on
habeas would be no greater than it currently is, and it would be offset
by the other reductions in the substantive scope of habeas. Finally, although the passage of time may make reexamination of innocencebased claims more difficult, that problem is not unique to these types
of claims. The difficulties would be diminished, in any event, by the
fact that habeas courts would still be required to give some deference
to state court factual findings,262 and by the fact that habeas petitioners would have a heavy burden to establish the existence
of any new facts.263 In sum, there is no compelling reason—given its
centrality to fundamental fairness—not to acknowledge innocencebased claims on habeas.
Simply acknowledging innocence as a ground for habeas relief is
not enough, however, for there are two types of innocence claims,
each raising its own concerns and implicating different constitutional
rights. A prisoner can argue that he is innocent based entirely on
“old” evidence—that is, evidence available at the time of trial or sentencing. Alternatively, a prisoner can contend that the jury might
have been correct to convict him on the evidence presented but that
newly discovered evidence exonerates him.264 Each type of innocence
claim is discussed separately.
1. Evidence of Innocence Existing at the Time of Trial or
Sentencing. A habeas petitioner can assert her innocence based on
evidence available at the time of trial or sentencing in one of two
ways. First, she can argue that, based on the evidence actually
presented at trial or at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable jury
could have convicted her or sentenced her to the punishment
imposed.265 This due process–based claim for innocence of the
underlying offense was recognized by the Supreme Court in Jackson

262. See infra Part IV.D.
263. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83.
264. See Bandes, supra note 200, at 503-05 (identifying three types of actual innocence
claims: (i) when the evidence at trial is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(ii) when evidence was overlooked and should have been presented at trial, but was not; and
(iii) when evidence discovered after trial establishes innocence).
265. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (“A federal court has a duty to assess
the historical facts when it is called upon to apply a constitutional standard to a conviction obtained in a state court.”).
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266
v. Virginia. Because of its strong tie to the petitioner’s innocence,
habeas petitioners should continue to be permitted to relitigate
Jackson claims on habeas under the combined theory proposed in this
Article.
Habeas petitioners should also be permitted to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their sentences. Thus far, the innocence exception for sentencing has been limited to sentences of
death.267 Sentences short of death can be equally unfair, however.
Lengthy prison sentences, like death sentences, are often triggered by
additional findings made at sentencing. If no reasonable sentencer
could have concluded that the evidence supported those findings,
continued incarceration is unfair regardless of the length of the sentence. Thus, for both innocence of the crime and innocence of the
sentence, a petitioner under the combined theory would prevail by establishing that no rational juror could have convicted her of the underlying crime or sentenced her to the punishment she received based
on the evidence presented.268
Second, the habeas petitioner would be able to assert that she is
innocent in light of evidence that existed at the time of trial or sentencing, but that she did not present. To prevail on this type of claim,
the petitioner would have to demonstrate first that she was not responsible for the failure to present the evidence—showing, for example, that the state prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence under
269
Brady v. Maryland, that other state officials interfered with her
ability to obtain or present the evidence,270 or that her counsel was
constitutionally ineffective.271 A failure properly attributed to the de-

266. See id. at 316 (holding that “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense”).
267. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1992); see also supra text accompanying
note 31.
268. This standard mirrors the standard announced in Jackson. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
(identifying “the relevant question” as “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”). It would, however, depart from the Sawyer standard
used to evaluate innocence of the death penalty. See supra note 31.
269. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Brady Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Id. at 87. If the evidence is “material,” the defendant is
entitled to a new trial.
270. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1953).
271. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel,
then, is cause for a procedural default” because “the Sixth Amendment itself requires that re-
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fendant, however, would not form a basis for revisiting the guilty verdict. The habeas petitioner would also have to demonstrate that no
jury evaluating her guilt or her sentence in light of the evidence presented, and the other evidence not presented, could rationally have
found her guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt or could
have sentenced her to the punishment imposed.
2. Later-Discovered Evidence of Innocence. A habeas petitioner
might also contend that new evidence that came to light after his trial
and sentencing would exonerate him or would have precluded the
trier of fact from imposing the sentence it did. Under the combined
theory, a state prisoner in this position would have to overcome two
hurdles before being permitted to raise such a claim on federal
habeas. As an initial matter, he would have to establish that he
exercised due diligence both in finding the evidence and in presenting
it promptly to the relevant court’s attention. Failure to exercise such
diligence would be grounds for barring the claim, unless the failure
were attributable to a cause outside the defendant’s control.272 A
habeas petitioner would also have to present this newly discovered
evidence to the appropriate state tribunal or show that the time for
doing so had lapsed, which will more likely be the case.273
Unlike the types of innocence-based claims discussed above, a
claim premised on newly discovered evidence is more likely to be a
bare assertion of factual innocence unaccompanied by any other constitutional violation.274 In Herrera v. Collins,275 a slim majority of the

sponsibility for the default be imputed to the State . . . .”). Although the standard for evaluating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has
been attacked as insufficiently protective because a prisoner who is clearly guilty will have a
much harder, if not impossible, time demonstrating that her counsel’s deficient performance
“prejudiced” her, see, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 625, 644 (1986), there is no need to revisit Strickland for purposes of raising claims of innocence. That is because state prisoners with colorable proof of innocence would, by definition, be
in a better position to establish “prejudice” resulting from their counsels’ lack of competence.
272. Although this standard could technically permit a state prisoner to file multiple habeas petitions based on newly discovered evidence, a petitioner would, of course, have to establish why the evidence was not discovered and presented in a prior petition. See infra Part IV.B.
273. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 nn.8-10 (1993) (collecting state statutes that limit the time to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence).
274. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing claims involving violations of due process under Jackson v. Virginia, claims of prosecutorial misconduct under Brady, and claims of constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland).
275. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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Court held that “[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in
the underlying state criminal proceeding.” 276 This holding was clouded
somewhat by other portions of the majority’s opinion and by the
separate opinions in the case, however. Notwithstanding its seemingly
clear holding, the majority went on to “assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional . . . .”277 Fleshing out this
argument further, the majority noted that the “threshold showing”
under its standard “would necessarily be extraordinarily high.”278 Two
members of that majority, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, would
have reserved the question whether a constitutional basis for such a
claim existed.279 Justice White concurred separately to opine that such
a claim should exist.280 Justice Blackmun, joined by two other Justices,
dissented on the ground that such a constitutional claim should exist.281 Not surprisingly, some academics have read Herrera as recognizing a constitutional foundation for naked claims of innocence.282
Because Herrera was based on an interpretation of the statutory
writ that Congress is free to amend, the case itself does not pose an
impediment to legislative efforts to recognize innocence-based claims
as a function of fundamental fairness. Herrera is instructive, however,
because the majority sketches the dangers that might flow from a toopermissive standard for judging innocence based on later-discovered
evidence—most notably, the potential flood of habeas petitions that

276. Id. at 400.
277. Id. at 417.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has no reason to pass on, and
appropriately reserves the question whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of
actual innocence. That difficult question remains open.”). But see id. at 419 (“I cannot disagree
with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution.”).
280. See id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (“In voting to affirm, I assume that a persuasive
showing of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial, even though made after the expiration of the
time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of the petitioner in this case.”).
281. See id. at 430-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the execution of the innocent
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
282. See Friedman, Failed Enterprise, supra note 9, at 509 (“What did the Court do [in Herrera]? It actually held, by a vote of 9-0, that innocent people cannot be executed . . . .”).
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would follow if the gates were thrown open to all claims of actual innocence based on later-discovered evidence.
Yet the gates must remain open for the truly legitimate claims of
innocence.283 Thus, the standard for asserting this type of innocence
claim should be difficult, but not practically impossible, to meet. To
survive dismissal under the combined theory, a petitioner should be
required to present evidence that has some indicia of reliability and
that would, if true, create a reasonable doubt in the minds of a jury
evaluating that evidence and the evidence also presented at trial or
the sentencing hearing. To prevail on the merits, the petitioner would
have to prove that there is a reasonable possibility that no rational
jury could have convicted her or imposed the sentence it did when
presented with all the relevant evidence. For example, a prisoner
producing reliable DNA evidence showing that he could not have
been the perpetrator of the crime of which he was convicted would be
entitled to a hearing and perhaps relief, unless the purportedly exculpatory DNA evidence was not inconsistent with the prosecution’s
theory of the case.284 Admittedly, these standards are high, but they
would leave habeas open to the truly innocent, whose continued incarceration would be fundamentally unfair.
Thus, in the name of establishing her innocence, a habeas petitioner should be permitted to relitigate constitutional claims
arising under Jackson v. Virginia and its analogue for innocence of
the sentence, claims of unconstitutional state action or ineffective assistance of counsel related to her inability to present exculpatory evidence at trial or sentencing, and Herrera-type innocence claims
premised on evidence first discovered after conviction or sentencing.

283. Senator Leahy recently introduced a bill that seeks to hold open post-conviction relief
based on exonerative DNA evidence. See Innocence Protection Act of 2000, S. 2073, 106th
Cong.
284. Cases of actual innocence are not common, but they do occur. See, e.g., STAFF OF
HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 103d CONG., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF
MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS 3 (Comm. Print 1994) (reporting that in the past 20 years, 47 death
row inmates were released and subsequently had charges against them dropped, or they were
acquitted or pardoned); Stefanie Lindeman, Note, Because Death Is Different: Legal and Moral
Arguments for Broadening Defendants’ Rights to Discovery in Federal Capital Cases, 73 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 541, 550 (1999) (stressing that “in the last 20 years at least 70 people in the
United States have been released from death rows after being found innocent”). The incidence
of these cases is only likely to increase as DNA evidence becomes more widely available.
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B. Procedures Essential to Fairness of the Criminal Process
The innocence-based claims discussed above do not constitute
the entire universe of constitutional claims that habeas petitioners
may revisit on collateral attack under a writ fashioned on a combination of the fundamental fairness and appellate theories. As both the
text of the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent make clear,
the concept of fundamental fairness guards against more than the incarceration of innocent persons. The Bill of Rights establishes several
procedural guarantees that apply to all persons accused of crimes,
whether they be guilty or innocent.285 The Court has reaffirmed this
notion—that the Constitution protects procedural regularity for its
own sake—by acknowledging a category of constitutional errors that
warrant automatic reversal, even if their commission did not affect
the outcome of the trial proceedings.286 Moreover, at least one of the
“watershed rules of criminal procedure” that are to be given retroactive effect under Teague—namely, claims that the proceeding was
“dominated by mob violence”—appears to be concerned with procedural regularity.287 Thus, there is good reason to think that it would be
fundamentally unfair not to extend an additional federal “appeal” via
habeas, even to those without an adequate claim of actual innocence,
if the state proceedings by which such persons were convicted did not
provide the essential components of criminal process that society considers vital to a just adjudication of guilt.288
Identifying the rudimentary components of a just criminal proceeding is no easy task. At a minimum, such a basic right must be secured by the Constitution and be made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which assures that the right is “a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen285. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) (emphasizing that “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty alike”).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67 (listing “structural errors”).
287. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality) (reasoning that “procedures . . .
central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt” include assurances that “the proceeding was [not] dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor [did not] knowingly [make]
use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was [not] based on a confession extorted from
the defendant by brutal methods”).
288. Indeed, Justice Scalia, while advocating a version of the “full and fair opportunity” approach, nevertheless recognized that it would be appropriate for a federal habeas court to revisit
the merits of a claim “go[ing] to the fairness of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result.” Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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tal.’”289 But simple incorporation of a constitutional right that secures
a particular procedural component is not sufficient under the combined theory to place that component among the truly essential. Incorporation alone establishes that a constitutional right is important
enough to be made binding on the states during trial. The question
here, however, is not whether the rights should be enforced against
the states. Instead, the issue is whether a state prisoner should have
one more chance to relitigate alleged violations of those rights in federal court after already having the opportunity to do so before the
state tribunals.290 There is no logical incongruity in concluding that, although all incorporated rights are important enough to apply in state
proceedings, only some of them are important enough to warrant an
additional appeal in federal court.
That said, the Supreme Court has regrettably not yet formulated
any single test for distinguishing among those incorporated constitutional rights that are critical to fundamental fairness and those that
are not. In determining which constitutional errors are “structural”
and therefore subject to automatic reversal regardless of prejudice—a
potential proxy for the fundamentality of a right—the Court has employed several different criteria over the years. In most cases, the
Court has looked to practical considerations in assessing whether an
error was structural and has found errors to be structural where there
was no workable way to assess harmlessness under the harmless error
test.291 In many of those same cases, the Court also looked to whether
the error, as a matter of policy, was sufficiently important to the
workings of trials in our country to be deemed “structural.”292 The
Court has not purported to adhere to any single test, however, and it
289. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
290. See supra text accompanying note 146.
291. See supra note 144. As that footnote observes, the Court almost always cited the impracticality of harmless error review as a reason for declaring a certain violation “structural error.” With respect to many of these “structural errors,” there is no reason to question the
Court’s conclusions. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (recognizing that
the harmless error test is meaningless when the jury does not receive an adequate reasonable
doubt instruction because there is “no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny
can operate”); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984) (concluding that the harmless error test is meaningless when a defendant is wrongly denied the right to represent herself
because self-representation often undercuts the effectiveness of the defense).
292. See, e.g., Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281 (noting that the right to a jury trial was a “basic protection” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986)
(holding that discrimination in the selection of grand jurors mandated automatic reversal due to
“[t]he overriding imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging process”).
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has never attempted to define why the policy behind a particular right
has justified its inclusion in the small class of “structural errors.”
The Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence is equally unhelpful as a
basis for determining which incorporated rights secure “fundamental
fairness.” Although the Teague plurality created an exception to the
general rule against retroactive application of “new rules” for “watershed rules of criminal procedure,”293 the Court frankly admitted that it
was “unlikely that many such components of basic due process have
yet to emerge.”294 The Court’s subsequent cases bear this prediction
out, as the Court has rejected every attempt to fit new rules into this
exception.295 As a result, the Court has developed the contours of this
exception solely by negative inference. This exception is not ideal as a
proxy for the importance of a constitutional right in any event because it focuses on accuracy-based rights, a focus that is too narrow
for the fundamental fairness/appellate theory.296
Because the Court’s other habeas jurisprudence does not readily
enumerate which constitutional rights secure the components of a
criminal trial that society considers essential to a just adjudication of
guilt, there is a need for a systematic examination of this question,
which this Article attempts to set forth. Fortunately, the Court’s
precedent does provide some helpful guidance regarding the relative
importance of the different incorporated constitutional rights. What
follows is a brief sketch of the constitutional rights likely to be
deemed critical enough to the fairness of state procedures to warrant
an opportunity for relitigation of claimed violations on habeas.
1. Claims of Constitutional Violation That May Be Relitigated
on Habeas. The constitutional rights essential to making criminal
trials fair today, and which are important enough to permit
habeas petitioners to raise them again after litigation in the state
courts, would seem to include the following:
a. The Fourteenth Amendment right to an orderly trial by an
unbiased judge and jury. This small cluster of rights is listed first be-

293. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality).
294. Id. at 313.
295. See supra note 126 (collecting cases in which the Court has rejected a habeas petitioner’s attempt to fit a “new rule” into Teague’s second exception).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41 (discussing Justice Stevens’s conception of
fundamental fairness).
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cause procedural regularity is a hallmark of criminal adjudication under the Constitution. It is for this reason that the Court has not hesitated to overturn convictions when the trial was dominated by mob
violence,297 when the judge’s impartiality was compromised by a personal incentive to convict,298 or where the jury’s impartiality was in
question or its composition was tampered with.299 A defendant tried
when any of these conditions exists is not receiving what most Americans would agree is a real trial, let alone a fair one.
b. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury verdict.
It is a fundamental tenet of the American criminal justice system that
a person is presumed innocent until a jury concludes that the state has
established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, a
habeas petitioner should be able to revisit, through a collateral attack,
claims that the trial judge dispensed with the jury without a proper
300
waiver of the right to a jury trial and directed a verdict for the state,
or that the jury received a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt
instruction.301 There is currently some disagreement among the
Justices regarding the status of other errors in jury instructions,
particularly where the error arguably interfered with the jury’s ability
to ascertain whether an element had been established.302 There is a
297. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (“[I]f in fact a trial is dominated by a
mob so that there is an actual interference with the course of justice, there is a departure from
due process of law.” (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915))).
298. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (“But it certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to subject [a defendant’s] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge
of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
his case.”).
299. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (upholding a death penalty verdict
where the trial judge excluded a clearly qualified juror during voir dire and holding that a viol ation of the right to an impartial jury is per se reversible). Tampering with jury composition
would encompass both claims of discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, see, e.g.,
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1985) (holding that discrimination among members of the
grand jury is “structural error”), and discrimination in the selection of petit jurors, see Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination in the selection of petit jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause).
300. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (“[A] trial
judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward
with such a verdict [for the state].”).
301. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (holding that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction requires reversal of a conviction).
302. The Court is currently divided over how to handle errors in jury instructions where the
omission or misdescription of the element precludes the jury from making a finding on that
element. When it is possible for a reviewing court to conclude that the jury necessarily and actually found the missing element when it found the other elements, there is no need for reversal.
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compelling argument that errors that precluded or prevented the jury
from finding an element effectively direct a verdict for the state on
that element and accordingly warrant automatic reversal. This sort of
instructional error would therefore seem to have the strongest basis
for relitigation on habeas. Instructional errors that do not take away
from the jury’s ability to find an element, however, would not seem to
warrant an additional “appeal” via habeas.
c. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Inquisitorial
trials behind closed doors are anathema to our system of criminal
justice and are barred by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
right to a public trial. Violation of this right is also a structural error. 303
Accordingly, claims premised on this right should be reheard on
habeas.
d. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel: deprivation of
304
counsel. Since Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court has consistently
held that the failure to provide counsel to defendants tried for
felonies and certain misdemeanors is a “structural error” warranting
automatic reversal.305 The right to counsel has been held to guarantee
the presence of counsel at all “critical stages” of the criminal
process—from the initial appearance through sentencing.306 Given the
See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). When it is not possible
to so conclude, Justice Scalia would find that the conviction must be reversed because not every
element has been found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2,
7-8 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring). Other members of the Court would uphold the verdict as long
as the error is harmless, presumably because no rational jury could have failed to find the missing element. See Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1838 (1999) (opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, & Breyer, JJ.); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 582 & n.11
(1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J, and White, Rehnquist, & O’Connor, JJ.).
303. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (holding that closing a trial to all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers violates the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a public trial).
304. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
305. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (declaring a violation of
Gideon to be a “structural defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies]
analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1968)
(listing Gideon and its assurance of the right to counsel as one of the “constitutional rights so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error”).
306. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (stating that a preliminary hearing, where a judge determines whether there is probable cause to detain a defendant for trial, is
a “critical stage” requiring counsel); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (establishing that
a sentencing proceeding is a “critical stage” where an attorney must be afforded); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (ruling that the initial appearance before a court, where a defendant is informed of his rights, is a “critical stage” at which counsel is required, the violation
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complexities of the criminal law, having counsel present at these
“critical stages” would seem to be one of the essential components
that make the American adversarial criminal process what it is.
The right to the presence of counsel is not limited to these situations, however. In a troika of cases, the Supreme Court held that
counsel was also required to be present at post-indictment line-ups of
suspects, at one-man “show-ups,” and at preliminary hearings where
a witness is present to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of a
crime.307 In these situations, counsel is not acting as an advocate, as
she is during the “critical stages” discussed above. Instead, counsel is
essentially functioning as a witness to ensure the fairness of the identification procedure. The Supreme Court itself has recognized this
distinction, as the absence of counsel from these identification procedures results in the exclusion of the identification evidence, rather
than in an inquiry into whether the absence prejudiced the defendant
in the proceedings as a whole, which is the usual test when counsel is
absent.308 The same may be said of Sixth Amendment claims arising
under Massiah v. United States,309 which requires the exclusion of any
confession deliberately elicited by police from a defendant after he
has retained counsel.310 These latter types of counsel claims are less
compelling, and they may therefore not warrant relitigation on habeas, particularly if alternative means of ensuring the fairness of the
identification procedures or police questioning are developed.311
of which is reversible error if the defendant is required to make any binding statements); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (holding that an arraignment, where a defendant enters a
plea, is a “critical stage” and the absence of counsel is per se reversible if the plea is binding).
There is also a right to counsel on the first appeal of right, but that right is grounded in the Due
Process Clause (rather than in the Sixth Amendment). See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
355 (1963).
307. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) (creating an exclusionary rule for incourt identifications based on prior identifications where counsel was not present); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (establishing the right to counsel at pretrial, postindictment line-ups and one-man show-ups); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227-31
(1977) (applying Wade and Gilbert to a witness identification occurring during a preliminary
hearing). The Due Process Clause also provides some protection against suggestive identification procedures. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
308. Compare supra note 38, with Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273 (establishing the exclusionary rule
for evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel).
309. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
310. See id. at 206; cf. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980) (noting that voluntary statements to a known police informant were not “deliberately elicited” and could be admitted at trial).
311. For example, computers might be used to electronically store the photos presented in a
photographic line-up or to digitally record in-person line-ups.
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e. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel: the right to represent
oneself. The Court has also recognized that criminal defendants have
a right to represent themselves in criminal trials if they are competent
312
to make that choice. Recognizing how basic it is to our system of
justice to permit a defendant to disclaim the counsel the state assigns
in favor of representing himself, the Court has held that the failure to
grant a competent person’s wish to represent himself is grounds for
automatic reversal.313 Although this type of claim is unlikely to arise
often, it should nevertheless be available on habeas.
f. The Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel. As the
Supreme Court has noted several times, the right to counsel is
314
meaningless unless counsel is minimally competent. In developing a
definition for competence in Strickland v. Washington,315 the Supreme
Court started from the premise that “[t]he benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”316 Not
surprisingly, the Court ultimately selected a standard that requires
defendants to establish not only that their counsel’s performance “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” but also that “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”317
By including a “prejudice” element in the prima facie showing
that a defendant must make to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland means that clearly guilty persons are less
likely to prevail on their claims because they will have more difficulty
establishing prejudice. Under the Court’s current interpretation of
this constitutional right, lower courts have found this to be the case
even when counsel is asleep during the trial.318 In these situations,
312. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).
313. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
314. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
315. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
316. Id. at 686.
317. Id. at 688, 694.
318. See, e.g., McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (rejecting an
“ineffective assistance of counsel” claim when one of petitioner’s two trial attorneys slept
through the trial), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997); Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 456-58
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counsel is, for all intents and purposes, absent from the trial. Denying
relief in these situations would appear to be inconsistent with Gideon,
however, because Gideon dictates automatic reversal of a conviction
obtained when counsel is physically absent.319 There is no logical reason why functional absence of counsel should be treated differently
from physical absence. Thus, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on “functional absence” should clearly be available for
relitigation on habeas, just as claims arising under Gideon are.320
The argument for relitigating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that do not involve “functional absence” is somewhat less
compelling. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are commonplace. They account for 25% of all constitutional claims raised in habeas petitions filed by state prisoners,321 and they are usually without
merit, as many petitioners try to recast dissatisfaction with the outcome as dissatisfaction with their attorney. The “reasonable competence” standard currently employed allows many of these less meritorious claims to go forward, but there is little reason to suspect that a
trial in which the quality of counsel’s representation lapsed on one or
two instances is fundamentally unfair or that it merits relitigation on
federal habeas after a full opportunity for litigation in state court.
Claims of ineffectiveness that fall short of “functional absence” but
nevertheless affect the entire course of representation should, however, be available for relitigation on habeas.322 Congress may wish to
distinguish between the varying types of Sixth Amendment claims

(Tex. Crim. App.) (Maloney, J., dissenting from denial of application for writ of habeas corpus)
(criticizing the majority for upholding a conviction obtained when the petitioner’s counsel slept
through part of his trial), cert. denied sub nom. Burdine v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1107 (1995). But see
Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that representation was ineffective if “counsel was repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which defendant’s interests were at stake”); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[W]hen an
attorney for a criminal defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial, such conduct
is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate showing of prejudice is necessary.”).
319. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
320. There is a good argument that claims of “functional absence” should also be exempted
from the requirement that a defendant establish prejudice under Strickland, in order to bring
them into line with Gideon-based claims of physical absence. A more detailed discussion of this
point is beyond the scope of this Article, however.
321. See HANSON & DALEY, supra note 21, at 14.
322. Accord Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1503-04 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(listing “[t]he deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel recognized in Strickland”
as an error “that undermine[s] confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication”).
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and to permit only the more serious type to be raised on federal habeas.
g. The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The
Confrontation Clause encompasses two distinct, but intimately
related, rights. The first is the right of compulsory process, which
enables a criminal defendant to call his accusers before him and
prevents the state from secreting away exculpatory testimony.
Included within its scope is the right to obtain the assistance of the
prosecution in identifying witnesses and the aid of the court in forcing
those witnesses to testify.323 These rights are important components of
fair trial procedure, and they should remain available for relitigation
on habeas.
Once these witnesses are before the court, the Confrontation
Clause also safeguards the ability of a defendant to cross-examine
those witnesses or to ensure that their absent testimony is properly
admitted. States may not completely preclude all cross-examination, 324
and they must insist that evidence introduced from absent witnesses
through the state’s hearsay rule have sufficient “indicia of reliability.”325 In many respects, these rights simply imbue state evidentiary
rules with constitutional significance.326 In the absence of a situation
where there is a dramatic departure from these state rules, litigation
over compliance with these rules can be left to the state courts, which
are more familiar with their own procedural rules.

323. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that the trial court must compel testimony of recalcitrant witnesses for the accused); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
62-63 (1957) (mandating that the prosecution must help a defendant identify witnesses when
such witnesses’ testimony is “highly relevant”).
324. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).
325. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
326. See, e.g., John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual CrossExamination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 195 (1999) (“By
treating the Confrontation Clause as a rule that excludes unreliable hearsay, the Court has
doomed the rule to redundancy with the law of evidence in the great majority of cases.”); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1022 (1998)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has tended to conform the Confrontation Clause to prevailing hearsay
doctrine. This approach devalues the Confrontation Clause, treating it as a constitutionalization
of an amorphous and mystifying evidentiary doctrine . . . .”); Edye U. Moran, Pyrrhic Victories
and Permutations: New Developments in the Sixth Amendment, Discovery, and Mental Responsibility, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1998, at 106 (“This year, as in years past, the Confrontation Clause in
child sex abuse cases transmogrifies what are normally simple hearsay evidentiary issues into
weighty Constitutional arguments.”).
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h. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It
would offend most reasonable persons if the state were permitted to
introduce evidence obtained by beating a confession out of a per327
son. Obviously, reasonable people understand that innocent suspects might confess to crimes they did not commit as a result of abuse,
torture, or fear of death. Accordingly, instances of physical coercion,
and perhaps some extreme cases of psychological coercion, should be
redressible on habeas. Until its decision in Arizona v. Fulminante,328
the Court had regarded involuntary confessions as grounds for automatic reversal; now they are evaluated for harmfulness.329 This recent
change in course, however, does not alter the fundamental importance of this guarantee.
i. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple prosecutions
330
for the same crime and multiple punishments for the same crime. It
is designed to preclude the state from wearing down an individual
with repeated prosecutions (if he is initially acquitted) or repeated
punishments (if he is initially found guilty). This is accordingly a fundamental protection against oppressive government action that warrants relitigation on habeas.
j. The Fifth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. Since the Court’s tripartite decisions in Gregg v.
331
332
333
Georgia, Jurek v. Texas, and Woodson v. North Carolina,
holding that the death penalty could be constitutionally imposed
327. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality) (noting that one “comp onent[] of basic due process” that invokes a “classic ground[]” for issuing a writ is a claim “that
the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (overturning on direct appeal a conviction based on a confession extracted by physical brutality).
328. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
329. Compare id. at 312 (holding that the introduction into evidence of involuntary confessions should be judged by the harmless error standard), with Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
568 (1958) (holding that the introduction into evidence of involuntary confessions warrants
automatic reversal of the conviction).
330. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (“[W]e do not doubt that the
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the
same offense as from being twice tried for it.”). This right was incorporated and made applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
331. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
332. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
333. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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under certain circumstances, the Court has articulated an elaborate
set of procedures that states must follow in sentencing persons to
death.
Although violation of these procedures has not typically been
subject to automatic reversal as “structural error,” and although these
procedures are of recent vintage,334 the grave consequences for error
and the importance of these procedures to assuring a just and rational
sentence make these types of claims appropriate for relitigation on
federal habeas.335
k. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As the
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence shows, the concept of due process has been interpreted to cover several different types of misconduct by the state—everything from impermissible comments by
336
prosecutors to domination of a trial by a mob. Owing to this elasticity, it is difficult to say whether any particular due process claim
should be relitigated on habeas. Instead, these claims should be
judged individually to see whether they implicate rights—similar to
the ones mentioned above—that are critical to what society deems
necessary for a trial to be fair.
2. Claims of Constitutional Violation That May Not Be Relitigated on Habeas. For the reasons discussed above, not every violation
of an incorporated constitutional right warrants an additional “appeal” to a federal court. The constitutional claims not listed above

334. State capital sentencing procedures must adhere to two guiding principles. First, the
procedures must ensure that the process of determining which defendants are eligible for the
death penalty channels the decisionmaker’s discretion in a regulated and rational manner. Before a person may be sentenced to death, he must be convicted of a crime for which the death
penalty is an appropriate punishment, and the jury must find at least one “aggravating circumstance” that makes the death penalty particularly appropriate, that narrows the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty, and that is not vague. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,
971-72 (1994). Second, the sentencing body—when determining which eligible defendants will
actually receive the death penalty—must be permitted to make an individualized determination
based on the defendant’s character and the circumstances of the crime. See id. at 972-73. This
two-part system has not been universally embraced. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying these two principles as irreconcilable).
335. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516 (1995) (“Our opinions have repeatedly
emphasized that death is a fundamentally different kind of penalty from any other that society
may impose.” (citations omitted)).
336. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (ruling that a prosecutor may
not comment on a defendant’s invocation of his constitutional right not to testify on his own behalf).
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should normally be entrusted to the states to correct, as long as the
state provides a petitioner an opportunity to litigate them. A small
sampling of the claims that would no longer be cognizable if statutory
habeas were amended to reflect the combined approach includes the
following:
a. Fourth Amendment claims. Claims regarding the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule should not be cognizable on habeas.
As the Court noted in Stone v. Powell,337 a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by the police can be adequately addressed at trial or on
direct appeal, when the sting of a reversal is most likely to deter future unconstitutional behavior by police.338 Because Fourth Amendment violations also do not taint the trial itself, they are not sufficiently central to the procedural regularity of the adjudication of guilt
or innocence to warrant additional review on habeas.
b. Fifth Amendment Miranda claims. Similarly, claims that the
police failed to provide Miranda warnings do not necessarily mean
339
that the resulting confession was involuntary. In that respect,
Miranda’s exclusionary rule is broader than the Fourth
Amendment’s, which at least confines suppression to cases where
340
there has been a violation of the Constitution. Thus, while the
admission of involuntary confessions ranks among the more
fundamental of the constitutional violations, technical violations of
Miranda do not, and accordingly should not be reheard on habeas.
c. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. This
constitutional guarantee is designed to assure that the threat of

337. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
338. See id. at 493 (“There is no reason to believe, however, that the overall educative effect
of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not
be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.”).
339. The Court has repeatedly observed that non-Mirandized statements may be voluntary
and therefore constitutionally admissible under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation.”); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1974) (exempting voluntarily given, nonMirandized statements from the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, because not all Miranda
violations entail constitutional violations); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971)
(ruling that voluntarily non-Mirandized statements, unlike involuntary statements obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, may be admitted for impeachment purposes).
340. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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prosecution and/or pretrial detainment does not linger for an
inordinate amount of time.341 While this right is important, someone
who has been indicted but not tried has other pretrial remedies,
including the related statutory habeas writ, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, available
to him that should be sufficient in all but the most egregious cases.342
d. Sixth Amendment instructional errors. As discussed above,
errors in jury instructions that do not preclude or prevent the trier of
fact from finding an element of a crime should not be cognizable on
343
habeas.
e. The Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at
identification proceedings. For the reasons mentioned above, claims
that counsel was not present at pretrial events designed to enable
witnesses to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime may
not be subject to relitigation on habeas, especially if there is an
alternative means of assuring the fairness of the identification
procedure. Massiah claims may also be precluded, for many of the
344
same reasons.
f. The Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel. Congress
may also wish to distinguish among claims falling within the current
definition of ineffective assistance of counsel and to foreclose
relitigation of claims not premised on “functional absence” of counsel
and other claims of ineffectiveness affecting the entire course of
representation.345
g. The Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. As noted
above, claims premised on minor departures from state evidentiary
rules governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the scope of
346
cross-examination may not warrant relitigation on habeas.

341. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-21 (1972) (detailing the rationale behind the
right to a speedy trial).
342. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) (giving federal judges the power to grant the writ of habeas
corpus for prisoners in custody, but not necessarily pursuant to a conviction).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 300-02.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 309-11.
345. See supra text accompanying note 321.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 324-26.
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h. Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. As mentioned
above, there may be some due process claims that do not protect
essential components of fairness during the criminal process. Those
rights would not be cognizable on habeas under the combined model.
C. In Summary
Adopting a combined theory of habeas corpus that uses the appellate model to give content to the concept of fundamental fairness,
this Article has attempted to articulate the criteria for determining
which constitutional claims should remain open for relitigation on
habeas and which may only be litigated in the state courts. This part
also briefly discussed the constitutional claims that would satisfy these
criteria. The following table sets forth the results of this analysis:
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Innocence-based Claims:
• Insufficiency of the
evidence
• Brady-type claims
• Newly discovered
evidence
Claim of jury or judge bias
Deprivation of the right to a
jury verdict
Instructional errors that
take the consideration of
elements away from jurors
Deprivation of the right to a
public trial
Deprivation of counsel at
“critical stages” of criminal
proceedings
Ineffective assistance of
counsel affecting the course
of the entire trial
Denial of the right to
represent oneself
Denial of the right to
compulsory process
Denial of the privilege
against self-incrimination
Retrial or sentencing after
jeopardy attaches
Challenges to capital
sentencing procedures
Some due process violations
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Claims Not Cognizable on
Habeas
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Fourth Amendment
violations
Miranda violations
Denial of the right to a
speedy trial, except in
egregious cases
Instructional errors that do
not take consideration of
elements away from jurors
Ineffective assistance of
counsel not affecting course
of entire trial
Absence of counsel at
“identification” proceedings
Massiah violations
Curtailment of crossexamination or introduction
of hearsay evidence that
complies with state
evidentiary rules
Some due process violations

Keeping the narrower substantive scope of the writ in mind, the
Article now examines what should become of the procedural doctrines that had heretofore been used as an indirect tool for narrowing
the availability of the writ.
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IV. REVISITING THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF HABEAS
A major impetus behind most of the proposals to narrow the
substantive scope of the federal writ of habeas corpus is the desire to
replace a broad writ that effectively narrows its own availability by its
labyrinthine procedures with a writ having narrower substantive
347
breadth but fewer procedural hurdles. If Congress chooses to narrow the substantive scope of habeas using the combined model discussed in Part III, there would be less need for procedural screening
of claims. As a result, it is important to revisit the procedural and
quasi-procedural accoutrements of the current writ to determine
whether they should be modified or eliminated in light of the suggested changes to the substantive scope of the writ.
A. Exhaustion
As noted in Part I, the exhaustion doctrine requires state prisoners to raise their federal constitutional claims in state court before
348
they may be raised in federal habeas. Under the combined fundamental fairness/appellate model proposed in Part III, state prisoners
seeking to relitigate claims on federal habeas should continue to be
required to exhaust their claims in state court.349 Exhaustion mirrors
the general requirement that litigants preserve claims in lower courts
before raising them on appeal.350 This allows the state courts the first
opportunity to consider the claims of their own prisoners, and it creates a record and decision for the federal court to examine during the
habeas “appeal.” This requirement should therefore be retained.

347. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
349. The requirement should also be retained for state prisoners who are permitted to proceed in federal habeas because they did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to raise their federal constitutional claims in the state courts. Of course, these petitioners will necessarily be able
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement because, by definition, “there is an absence of available
State corrective process” and this absence meets the exhaustion requirement. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1997).
350. See Liebman, supra note 109, at 2094-95 (“Via the exhaustion doctrine, the Court recently has assured that habeas corpus petitioners, like direct appellants, cannot seek the reviewing court’s consideration before seeking the prior court’s judgment.”); cf. Friedman, Two
Habeas, supra note 1, at 317 (noting that a separate exhaustion requirement is unnecessary in
light of the general rule that a litigant must preserve claims before lower tribunals).
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B. Procedural Default
The doctrine of procedural default gives force to state procedural
rules on federal habeas by barring habeas courts in most cases from
reviewing the merits of any federal constitutional claim that the state
courts declined to reach because of the prisoner’s failure to comply
with state procedural rules. In this respect, it is similar to the general
appellate rule that a claim is deemed waived if it is not raised by the
appellant or otherwise addressed by the court below.351 The two doctrines are not identical, however. On direct appeal, the waiver rule is
strictly enforced.352 The current procedural default doctrine, by contrast, is equitable in nature, and it permits courts to overlook defaults
if the habeas petitioner can either establish “cause” and “prejudice”
or demonstrate that his continued incarceration would be a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” because he is probably innocent of the
crime or sentence.353
A modified version of the procedural default doctrine should be
enforced under the combined fundamental fairness/appellate model
of habeas. It is true that this model is based in part upon the appellate
model, which dictates the adoption of an absolute rule that would bar
354
a habeas court from hearing any defaulted claims. However, the absolute rule suggested by the “pure” appellate model is inappropriate
for a writ also designed as a bulwark against fundamental unfairness,
for it would, among other things, permit the continued incarceration
of a person who is innocent on the sole ground that she did not comply with state procedural rules.
351. See, e.g., SAC and FOX Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that “[a]s a general rule we refuse to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556,
558 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Issues not presented to the trial court cannot generally be raised for the
first time on appeal.”).
352. Indeed, a litigant’s default of a claim in state court is a jurisdictional bar when appeal is
taken from the state supreme court to the United States Supreme Court. That is because a state
court’s reliance on the state procedural bar acts as an “adequate” and “independent” state
ground that robs the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of any defaulted federal
claim. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1989):
This Court long has held that it will not consider an issue of federal law on direct review from a judgment of a state court if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that
is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the
court’s decision.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 23-43.
354. See Friedman, Two Habeas, supra note 1, at 298 (observing that “habeas courts [under
an appellate model] would not hear defaulted claims unless they could be reviewed directly by
the Supreme Court”).
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Under the proposed model, a more modest modification to the
procedural default doctrine is warranted. As modified, a habeas petitioner who had the opportunity to litigate a federal constitutional claim in state court but defaulted the claim would not be entitled to have the habeas court review the merits of her claim until she
either established “cause” for the procedural default or showed that
her continued incarceration would be a “fundamental miscarriage of
justice” because she is able to demonstrate her probable innocence of
the underlying crime or sentence. Habeas petitioners who were denied an opportunity to litigate their federal claims in state court
should also be subject to this rule, but they would necessarily be able
to demonstrate “cause” because the state, by definition, interfered
with their ability to raise the claim.355
This modified standard eliminates the requirement that a prisoner prove “prejudice” along with “cause” because a “prejudice” requirement is either unnecessary or unwarranted given the range of
substantive claims still available under the narrowed writ. A “prejudice” requirement is unnecessary for the innocence-based claims that
remain cognizable because those claims would already fit within the
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception. A “prejudice” requirement would also be unwarranted for the remaining claims cognizable on habeas because those claims secure procedural protections
that are available to all individuals, regardless of their guilt. Demanding a showing of prejudice before such claims could be heard
would effectively deny them to guilty persons, even though those protections are guaranteed to anyone accused of a crime.
To be sure, this modified doctrine would permit any habeas petitioner the opportunity to demonstrate his innocence or to
show cause for his default in order to proceed on habeas notwithstanding the procedural default in state court. But the substantive
scope has been narrowed to permit relitigation of only those constitutional claims most central to fundamental fairness. It therefore makes
sense that fewer barriers should stand in the way of vindicating such
rights.

355.

See supra note 43.
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C. Retroactivity
The nonretroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane356 is an
expansive one. Under current law, habeas petitioners may not avail
themselves of developments in the law of constitutional criminal procedure occurring after the date upon which their convictions become
final, unless the “new rule” announced in the new decisions either
places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power” of the criminal law to proscribe or establishes a “new procedure[] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”357 Teague or a similar rule of nonretroactivity is
considered appropriate for a writ based on a pure appellate model
because, with few exceptions, it places habeas petitioners in the same
position they were in at the time their convictions became final by not
giving them the benefit of most post–direct appeal advances in the
relevant case law.358
A general rule of nonretroactivity is unwarranted, however, for a
writ based in part upon the fundamental fairness model. As Justice
Stevens noted in his Rose v. Lundy359 dissent, the degree to which a
particular constitutional right is deemed essential to fundamental
fairness can be gauged in large part upon whether it was held to apply
retroactively on habeas under the Court’s pre-Teague retroactivity
rules, since “the Court certainly would not allow claims of such magnitude to remain unremedied.”360 If the substantive scope of the writ
has been narrowed to allow relitigation of only those constitutional
claims premised on a violation of those rights essential to fundamental fairness, as the writ described in Part III has been, habeas petitioners able to assert such claims should not be foreclosed from relying upon subsequent legal developments pertaining to those
fundamental rights. Allowing habeas petitioners to relitigate claims

356. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
357. Id. at 311, 313 (plurality) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
358. See Liebman, supra note 109, at 2007 (“In substance . . . the nonretroactivity bar [of
Teague] actually preserves parity between direct and habeas corpus review.”).
359. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
360. Id. at 544 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In ruling that a constitutional principle is not to
be applied retroactively, the Court implicitly suggests that the right is not necessary to ensure
the integrity of the underlying judgment.”). Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens took the Teague
majority to task for narrowing its second exception for “fundamental fairness” solely to those
claims relevant to the accuracy of the guilty verdict. In his view, this narrower definition would
preclude some rights essential to fundamental fairness from being applied retroactively, despite
their importance. See id. at 321-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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premised on violations of the rights cognizable on habeas under the
fundamental fairness/appellate model also permits the federal district
courts hearing these claims to participate in the crafting of the law affecting these most fundamental of constitutional rights, a valuable
function given the Supreme Court’s inability to hear all direct appeals
involving those rights.361
This logic does not apply to those habeas petitioners who are
permitted to proceed in federal court with other, less fundamental
constitutional claims solely because the state court denied them a
“full and fair opportunity” to litigate their claims. To the extent these
petitioners are not raising any of the claims designated as essential to
fundamental fairness, the argument for allowing them to avail themselves of subsequent advances in the law is less compelling. Moreover,
for them, federal habeas is simply taking the place of the direct appeal that they were denied. These petitioners should therefore be
confined to the law as it existed at the time that they would have had
their direct appeal, and some variant of Teague should apply to them.
D. Standard of Review
Until recently, habeas courts deferred to state courts’ findings of
fact by reviewing them for clear error but made an independent, de
novo assessment on questions of federal law and on the mixed questions involving the application of that law to specific facts.362 In the
last seven years, however, this bifurcated standard of review has come
into question. Justice Thomas’s three-Justice plurality in Wright v.
West363 suggested (but did not hold) that questions of law and mixed
questions of law and fact should be reviewed solely for their reasonableness.364 Under this potential new standard, which Justice Thomas
would derive from Teague, federal courts would not be permitted to

361. See Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 866 (“Were the lower federal courts not
enlisted in the effort [to review the constitutional claims of state prisoners], federal habeas
would surely cease to exist as an effective remedy for state prisoners.”); cf. Friedman, Habeas
and Hubris, supra note 105, at 799-800 (“In Teague v. Lane and its progeny, the Supreme Court
silenced the habeas courts.”). Of course, lower courts usually craft constitutional law not by departing from precedent, but by applying that precedent to factual circumstances not previously
encountered by the Supreme Court.
362. See supra text accompanying note 55.
363. 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
364. See id. at 294 (plurality) (discussing petitioner’s argument that “if deferential review for
reasonableness strikes an appropriate balance with respect to purely legal claims, then it must
strike an appropriate balance with respect to mixed questions as well”).
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correct a state court’s interpretation or application of federal constitutional law as long as that interpretation or application was not unreasonable, even if the federal court would have decided the issue differently itself.365 Congress appears to have codified this rule of
deference to state court findings of law and mixed questions of law
and fact in AEDPA, which provides that the writ must be denied unless the state court’s “decision . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”366 As noted
above, the Supreme Court just this Term held that this language restricted habeas relief to three situations: (i) when “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases”;367 (ii) when “the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”;368 and (iii) when “the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable,”369 even
if the federal court would have concluded “in its own independent
judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” 370
Under this Article’s proposed combined writ, the original bifurcated standard of review would be restored. This approach is consistent with a pure appellate model because it mirrors the standard of
review most state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court apply on direct
review, that is, de novo review.371 This approach also makes sense for
a writ that is confined to relitigation of only those rights essential to
fundamental fairness, because it seems wrong to require federal
courts to stand idly by when a state court interprets or applies such
fundamental constitutional rights in an incorrect, but not unreason-

365. Justice Thomas read Teague’s definition of when a rule is “new”—that is, when the rule
is “subject to debate among reasonable minds”—as indicating the Court’s willingness to defer to
state courts on questions of federal constitutional law. See id. at 291-92 He then reasoned that
mixed questions should also receive deferential review: “[I]f deferential review for reasonableness strikes an appropriate balance with respect to purely legal claims, then it must strike an appropriate balance with respect to mixed questions as well.” Id. at 294.
366. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
367. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000).
368. Id. at 1523.
369. Id. at 1521.
370. Id. at 1522.
371. See supra note 55; cf. Chen, supra note 57, at 607 (“The new habeas statute [with its
deferential standard of review] is an all out assault on [the appellate model].”).
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able, manner.372 Limiting habeas courts to correcting unreasonable
applications also “inhibits their participation in the law’s development
by preventing them from articulating reasoned expositions of constitutional principle.”373
The bifurcated standard of review should also apply to habeas prisoners denied a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate their
claims in state court. For them, federal habeas review is a substitute
for a direct appeal. It is therefore appropriate that the same bifurcated standard of review be applied on habeas that would have been
applied on direct review. In addition, in cases where there is a total
denial of the opportunity to litigate a claim, there may be no findings
on questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact to which to defer.
E. Standard for Relief
One of the final issues a habeas court must resolve is what remedy is appropriate once it concludes that a state prisoner’s constitutional rights have been violated. Until the Supreme Court’s decision
374
in Brecht v. Abrahamson, it was generally assumed that the standard for relief set down in Chapman v. California375 and Arizona v.
Fulminante376 for review on direct appeal also applied on habeas. Under Chapman and Fulminante, constitutional violations falling within
the narrow list of “structural errors” entitle a petitioner to automatic
reversal, while other errors require reversal only if the government
cannot demonstrate that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”377 The Court’s 1993 Brecht decision setting forth the standard

372. See Chen, supra note 57, at 543-44 (arguing that reasonableness review “severely limits
any deterrent function that habeas could possibly serve by significantly depriving federal courts
of the power to review state court decisions in a meaningful way”); Liebman, supra note 109, at
2032 (claiming that “the writ’s deterrent purpose is ill-served . . . by allowing state courts to misapply existing law as long as they do so ‘reasonably’”); cf. Woolhandler, supra note 105, at 640
(“The overall effect of focusing on reasonable interpretations of law outside the agency context
is to delegate power to interpret the Constitution to subordinate officers. That power, in turn,
allows officials to inflict discrete random constitutional harms subject to little or no federal judicial review.”).
373. Chen, supra note 57, at 539.
374. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
375. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
376. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
377. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 297 (requiring the state to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improper admission of a confession was harmless
error); supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
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for relief on federal habeas retained the per se reversal rule for structural errors but made it more difficult to obtain reversal for other errors by requiring the habeas petitioner to show that “the error ‘had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.’”378
Brecht’s more deferential standard should not apply when habeas
courts are relitigating constitutional claims under the combined fundamental fairness/appellate model. All of the claims cognizable by
this combined model are, by definition, critical to assuring the fundamental fairness of the criminal process. Indeed, the violation of several of these rights is already “structural error” subject to automatic
379
reversal. While there is a good argument that the violation of any of
these particular rights should be “structural error,” their importance
to fundamental fairness at the very least counsels strongly against the
application of a more deferential standard for relief like the one announced in Brecht.
Brecht’s standard should also not be applied when the habeas p etition is raising claims for which the state did not provide a “full and
fair opportunity” for litigation. Again, in this situation, habeas acts as
a substitute for a direct appeal, and it seems only equitable that petitioners in this situation be treated no worse than they would have
been had they received a direct appeal. Chapman’s standard is therefore the appropriate standard to be applied in this context.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NARROWER STATUTORY WRIT
Before a Congress inclined to narrow the federal writ of habeas
corpus were to do so along the lines suggested in Parts III and IV of
this Article, it is important to assess whether the newly constituted
writ would comport with the Constitution. As noted above, this Article has focused on changes to the statutory writ of habeas corpus con-

378. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946));
cf. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1995) (declining to classify any particular party as
having the “burden of proof” in concluding that a judge who entertains “grave doubt” about the
effect of an error under Brecht should award relief). Brecht recognized that its new, more deferential rule might not apply
in an unusual case [where] a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial
type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it
did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9.
379. Compare supra text accompanying notes 62-67, with supra Part III.B.
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tained in section 2254, which specifically addresses the claims of persons in state custody.380 However, there are other statutory writs, and
perhaps even a common law writ, of habeas corpus.381 In order to effectively narrow the writ for state prisoners, Congress would need to
be sure to close off these other writs, or else modifications to section
2254 would be rendered superfluous by the availability of these other
remedies.382 This section proceeds on the assumption that section 2254
as modified is the only writ available,383 briefly sketches out the four
possible constitutional inquiries, and offers some observations on the
probable outcome of those inquiries.
The Constitution’s primary limitation on the writ is the Suspension Clause, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”384 The language of
this constitutional provision is particularly unhelpful in ascertaining
the limits of Congress’s power to modify the federal writ of habeas
corpus. As an initial matter, the text of the Clause only prohibits a
suspension of the writ. It does not require that Congress even create
the writ, although a bar on suspending the writ would appear to imply
a duty to create some writ in the first place.385 The Clause also does

380. See supra note 1.
381. See supra note 1.
382. Congress’s failure to explicitly eliminate § 2241 as an alternative remedy for persons
wishing to raise challenges to deportation in the immigration context has led many courts of appeals to conclude that § 2241 remains a viable remedy, even though Congress appears to have
intended to foreclose all relief in that context. See, e.g., Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir.
1999); Jurado-Guiterrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999); Requena-Rodriguez v.
Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1999);
Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1999); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th
Cir. 1999); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1999); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106,
112 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1141 (1999); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 152 F.3d 1213,
1214 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 113 (1st
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999).
383. The Supreme Court held as much in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953)
(“[F]ederal courts may not grant habeas corpus for those convicted by the state except pursuant
to § 2254.”).
384. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Jordan Steiker has argued that the Suspension Clause
should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, with the synergy of
the two provisions creating “mandat[ory] federal habeas review of the convictions of state prisoners.” Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 868.
385. See Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 864 (pointing out that “the Clause might
simply limit Congress’s ability to abolish a judicial remedy that it is not elsewhere required to
establish”).
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not elaborate on the constitutionally required contours of the writ,
and the Supreme Court has assiduously avoided the issue.386
Given this ambiguity, it is not surprising to see that the courts
and commentators have identified four possible meanings for the
Clause. Some have contended that the Suspension Clause demands
that Congress maintain no more than a writ of habeas corpus comparable to the writ that existed in 1789.387 Because the writ at that time
assured little more than conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction,388 this first interpretation would accord Congress great latitude in
modifying the statutory writ. Under this interpretation, there would
seem to be little danger of constitutional infirmity if the writ were
amended to comport with the fundamental fairness/appellate model.
At least one commentator has argued that the Suspension Clause
precludes Congress from narrowing the writ beyond its contours as of
1868, when Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment and at the
same time expanded the writ to make it generally available to state
prisoners in all cases where a person was “restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States.”389 To be sure, the writ in 1867 was broader than the
writ in 1789.390 Since 1789, Congress had twice amended the writ to afford relief to state prisoners if they had been “committed . . . for any
act done . . . in pursuance of a law of the United States” or were a

386. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996) (assuming, but explicitly not deciding, that the Suspension Clause “refers to the writ as it exists today”); Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1976) (finding “no occasion” to define the contours of constitutional limits
on congressional modification of the writ).
387. See, e.g., Swain, 430 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the intention of the Framers and their understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time the Constitution was drafted.”);
Friendly, supra note 92, at 170 (“It can scarcely be doubted that the writ protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the framers, not as Congress may have chosen to expand
it.”).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
389. Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 888 (“If the ‘right’ to habeas corpus is properly
located in the Fourteenth Amendment, the contours of that right must be discussed in light of
the writ’s transformation between 1789 and 1868.”). See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385,
385. As noted above, the 1789 writ reached only persons in federal custody and did not specify
the possible grounds for release. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 82 (providing
that the writ is available to prisoners “in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the
United States, or . . . committed for trial before some court of the same”).
390. See Steiker, Incorporating, supra note 82, at 881 (“[I]t is simply wrong to assert that the
writ known to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was the same narrowly circumscribed
writ known at English law, or perhaps even known to the Framers of the Suspension Clause.”).
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“subjects or citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled therein.”391 But
despite the plain language of the amended writ and its application to
state prisoners, the writ still failed to afford relief in many situations
until well into the twentieth century.392 As a result, the modified writ
discussed in this Article would likely pass muster under this historical
view of the Suspension Clause as well.
Still others have argued that the Suspension Clause secures the
statutory writ as it exists today, such that any curtailment of the sub393
stantive scope of the writ is potentially unconstitutional. While this
approach would surely render invalid any attempts to modify the writ
along the lines suggested in this Article, the validity and wisdom of
this approach are questionable. Stone v. Powell394 removed Fourth
Amendment claims from the substantive scope of habeas over thirty
years ago.395 If the Suspension Clause barred any narrowing of the
writ, Stone would be unconstitutional, but it has not been so declared.
The recent congressional amendments to habeas procedure contained
in AEDPA, which have the effect of eliminating relief on habeas,
would also be unconstitutional, but they have also not been declared
to be.396 Equating the statutory writ with the constitutional writ may
be imprudent as a policy matter as well. As noted above, Congress
and the courts have greatly expanded (and, at times, narrowed397) the
reach of habeas corpus over the past two hundred years. Interpreting
391. See supra note 4.
392. As one might expect, there is disagreement over whether the Court was interpreting
the writ narrowly, see Bator, supra note 91, at 469-71, or whether the Court was interpreting the
writ to reach all constitutional claims, but few such claims were available at the time, see Peller,
supra note 5, at 618, 630. While both interpretations of history are partially correct, see supra
note 109, the undeniable bottom line is that the statutory writ—no matter what the reason—did
not afford relief in very many situations until the 1960s.
393. The Ninth Circuit recently so held in Magana-Piazno v. INS, 152 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th
Cir.) (emphasizing that “we assess the writ which the Constitution protects against suspension
‘as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789’” (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664
(1996))), amended, 159 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999). The Ninth Circuit’s original holding on this point, however, rests on a misreading of Felker, which simply assumed that the current statutory writ was the proper benchmark but did not definitively so hold.
See Felker, 518 U.S. at 663-64.
394. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
395. See id. at 494-95 (holding that, after having an “opportunity for full and fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be used as a
ground for habeas”).
396. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (upholding AEDPA’s restrictions limiting the ability of habeas petitioners to file multiple petitions).
397. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 506-07 (1869) (reviewing Congress’s
1868 elimination of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas petitions).
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the Constitution to forbid any narrowing “would create an irrational
ratchet,” because “[h]abeas corpus could always be enlarged, but
once enlarged could not be returned to its previous, less generous
scope without a constitutional amendment.”398 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court may ultimately decide not to adopt this view of the
Suspension Clause, and thus the writ proposed in this Article would
not be invalidated under such an interpretation.
In Felker v. Turpin,399 the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion
on the meaning of the Suspension Clause, the Court may have coined
a fourth approach to assessing the constitutionality of modifications
to the federal writ of habeas corpus. In that case, the Court upheld
AEDPA’s new restrictions on the filing of subsequent habeas petitions because they were “well within the compass of [the] evolutionary process” of habeas, which was described by the Court as “‘a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and
controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial
decisions.’”400 In light of the Court’s and, more recently, Congress’s
curtailment of the writ by tightening the procedural screws of habeas,
as well as the Court’s flirtation with narrowing the substantive scope
of habeas in Stone and its progeny, a statutory modification that exchanges some of the procedural hurdles for a focus on rights essential
to fundamental fairness would not seem outside this evolutionary
process, particularly when one takes into account the historical narrowness of the writ. The modified writ suggested in this Article is
likely to satisfy the Felker Court’s conception of the Suspension
Clause.
In light of this cursory analysis, it appears likely that Congress
would not run afoul of the Suspension Clause if it proceeded to narrow the substantive scope of the federal writ, either one piece at a
time or in toto, in accordance with the fundamental fairness/appellate
model described in Parts III and IV.

398. LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1157
(2000).
399. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
400. Id. at 664 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991)); accord LaGuerre, 164
F.3d at 1039 (“We are suggesting not that the meaning of habeas corpus in the suspension clause
was set in stone in 1787 . . . but only that the meaning of the constitutional term does not move
in lockstep with changes in the meaning of the statutory term.”).
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CONCLUSION
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has created a labyrinth of procedural hurdles for state prisoners seeking relief under the
federal writ of habeas corpus, but it has only twice tinkered with the
substantive scope of the writ—in Stone v. Powell and its progeny, and
in Teague v. Lane. More recently, Congress has started to consider
legislation that would eliminate certain types of claims from habeas review. Although these efforts to narrow the universe of claims
cognizable on habeas are a more straightforward means of reducing
the actual availability of the writ than creating new and complex procedural hurdles, tinkering with the scope of the writ can be just as
problematic if it is not done rationally.
This Article has attempted a comprehensive exploration of how
a Congress intent upon narrowing the substantive scope of the statutory writ might proceed. Even if Congress were to eliminate one or
two claims at a time from the reach of federal habeas, it should have
an underlying and coherent theory of the purpose and role of habeas
review in mind. After examining several theories, the Article concludes that the most appropriate theory is one that recognizes both
the role of habeas as a bulwark against fundamental unfairness and its
function today as an additional “appeal” from state court. Under this
hybrid theory, the only constitutional claims that would be subject to
relitigation on federal habeas are those for which it would be fundamentally unfair to deny an additional appeal in federal court. The Article has also described which constitutional claims would be likely to
satisfy this standard, detailed how the procedural doctrines that were
previously used to screen claims should be modified, and examined
whether this newly constituted writ would be constitutional under the
Suspension Clause. In the end, this combined theory may provide a
workable model for creating a writ that raises fewer procedural roadblocks but that still continues to assure justice to state prisoners who
are wrongly incarcerated.

